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Near East & South Asia

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REGIONAL

Head of Palestinian Department Discusses Effects of Uprising

45040121 London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
25 Apr 88 pp 25-26

[Interview with Ambassador Taha al-Farnawani, Director of Palestinian Department at the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, with 'Abd al-Muhsin Sayf-al-Din, in Cairo; date not given]

[Excerpts] In a wide-ranging interview with AL-DUSTUR, Ambassador Taha al-Farnawani, director of the Palestinian Department at the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, said that the Palestinian uprising is continuing despite violent Israeli repression. He said that the uprising has caused a great change in the balances of power and reopened the file of the Palestinian question after it had disappeared for some time. Ambassador al-Farnawani stressed that a Palestinian state has in fact been in existence since the end of the Ottoman rule in 1919, and that the Arabs should stop talking about self-determination because it has in fact been determined. What is needed is liberation, he said. Ambassador al-Farnawani said that Shultz' visit has brought nothing new; it is merely an attempt to gain time and contain the uprising. He said if the United States is really seeking peace then it should directly talk to the PLO, the party concerned in the case, and abolish Kissinger's doctrine of 1975 which bans negotiations with the PLO. The interview contains other interesting issues which Ambassador Taha al-Farnawani brings up.

[Question] The Israeli enemy leaders believed that the Palestinian problem was buried after the Palestinians' departure from Lebanon. How far has the uprising in the occupied territories contributed to strengthening the cause?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the Palestinian uprising was a surprise to all the parties in the area and has led to a change in the balances of power in the region. Prior to the uprising the talk was about "autonomous rule for the inhabitants" and "limited autonomy." But after the stone revolution was launched in the country all the parties, including Israel, the United States, and the Western countries have been prompted to reach a settlement for the Palestine problem through a comprehensive solution and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. I am fully convinced that the establishment of an independent Palestinian state can be achieved only by continuing and developing this revolution.

[Question] Can we call the present uprising a comprehensive Palestinian revolution, and does it pose a real danger to Israel's security?

[Answer] There are certain parties, particularly some of the Israeli leaders, that are trying to belittle the Palestinian revolution now raging in the occupied territories so

that it will be possible to take measures that would suppress the revolution. They are trying to gain time without entering into real negotiations for peace. At the same time, the Palestinian revolution is winning the support and sympathy of the world. Despite the attempts to belittle the importance of this revolution, everybody inside Israel realizes the danger the revolution is posing to Israel. This has prompted some of the Israelis to consider withdrawing from the West Bank and Gaza and to voice this view, something that was formerly unmentionable. The Israelis used to reject the application of Resolution 242 to the West Bank on the grounds that it is a liberated Israeli territory and not an occupied territory.

[Question] How possible is it in your opinion to develop the Palestinian revolution and enable it to continue in the future?

[Answer] Through our contacts with the Palestinian leaders both inside and outside the country, we can confirm that the revolution is continuing despite the methods of repression and coercion to which the Israeli occupation authorities are resorting and which are superior to Nazi methods. There is a strong desire on the part of all the Palestinian parties to continue and develop the revolution so that it will assume greater dimensions and comprehensive independence will be achieved. The present Palestinian generations accept nothing short of armed struggle. These generations will accept negotiating with Israel only after the independence of the Palestinian state is achieved. They are prepared to sacrifice for this cause in the same manner their brothers in Lebanon did when they forced the occupation forces to flee and withdraw, and when they raised the banner of martyrdom or victory. This is what is happening inside Palestine now. I believe that the barbaric Israeli repressive measures will lead to further escalation of the situation.

[Question] Certain foreign parties are trying to create the impression that certain Arab countries do not accept the establishment of a Palestinian state. How true is this?

[Answer] There are, in fact, parties that claim that certain Arab countries do not approve of the establishment of a Palestinian state. This is a gross misrepresentation which certain people are reiterating with the aim of furthering Arab differences. Through my meetings with Arab leaders, particularly the Jordanians, I gathered that there is support for the Palestinian people's right to determine their future. With regard to Egypt, it has at all times maintained that Gaza is part of the Palestinian state.

[Question] What about Arab aid for the Palestinian uprising? Is there indeed Arab aid for the people of the occupied homeland?

[Answer] As I said, the Palestinian revolution took the parties by surprise, including the Arab parties which were also taken by surprise. This has made it necessary

for the Arab parties to rearrange their priorities. The recent Amman summit was the best evidence of this fact. This summit did not give due attention to the Palestinian problem. The present revolution will force the Arab parties to move once again toward finding a solution for the Palestinian problem.

The Palestinian revolution can continue even without Arab aid, which is still inadequate. But this aid must be increased in the near future in order to confront the Israeli siege of the uprising. An Arab plan must be laid down to give material and moral aid to the Palestinian revolution so that the inhabitants of the occupied homeland will feel that their Arab brethren are backing them and following their struggle step by step.

[Question] What, in your opinion, is the way to establish an independent Palestinian state?

[Answer] In my opinion, the Palestinian state has actually been in existence since the end of the Ottoman rule in 1919. A Palestinian government was then established on the Palestinian territory and the British Mandate was working to prepare the Palestinian people to assume rule up to 1947. Therefore, drawing political lines between Israel and the Palestinian state and the partitioning resolution did not create a Palestinian state, but rather cut off a part from it for the Zionists. When [UN envoy] Bernadotte tried to alter the borders and enable the Palestinian refugees to return to their land, he was murdered by the Zionists. The 1949 military truce was a temporary truce and not political borders. And in 1982 a General Assembly resolution confirmed this Palestinian state by a great majority.

Therefore, the Arabs should not make concessions in advance and should stop demanding the Palestinian people's right to self-determination because this right actually exists and is confirmed. The Palestinian state exists too. The Palestinians and Arabs must liberate it from Israeli colonialism. Without liberating the Palestinian state there will be no solution for the problem.

[Question] What about Shultz' tour and his peace proposals to solve the problem?

[Answer] I believe that the United States' peaceful role in the area still needs further clarification. There is nothing new in the new U.S. initiative that would contribute to progress in the peace process. If Shultz really wants peace why doesn't he meet with a PLO delegation, the party really concerned with the problem? This move by the United States is intended to satisfy the Jewish communities which are concerned for the future of the Jewish state and to save America's face in the area. The United States makes the Soviet Union's participation in the peace process conditional upon its resumption of relations with Israel and allowing unrestricted immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel. So how can the United States take part in the peace process when its ties with the PLO are broken and when it insists on Kissinger's renowned

doctrine of not negotiating with the PLO? Which Arab country can speak on behalf of the Palestinians? If the United States or others want peace in the area they should address themselves to those concerned.

13305

Al-Farnawani Interviewed on Uprising, Other Matters

PM1306140988 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
8-14 Jun 88 p 13

[Interview with Ambassador Taha al-Farnawani, head of Palestine Department at the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, by Mahmud Husayn in Cairo; date not specified]

[Text] Husayn: Some Palestinian leaders blame some Arab states, among them Egypt, for their failure to provide sufficient support for the uprising, indicating that all that Egypt is doing is issuing statements of support and condemnation. Do you agree with such a claim?

Al-Farnawani: The Palestinians commanding the uprising long for Arab support and backing, and I believe that the aid and support provided so far by some Arab governments and peoples have not matched up to the sacrifices made by the Palestinian youths inside the occupied territories. As for blame and censure, they are between brothers.

Husayn: What about Egyptian support for the uprising so far?

Al-Farnawani: Apart from political support, immediately after the eruption of the uprising we contacted the Israeli authorities and requested permission to send Egyptian aid in accordance with the 1979 treaty, but they refused on the pretext that there were sufficient quantities of food and medicine. We resubmitted the application and insisted that it be accepted and that Israel honor its commitments under the 1979 treaty. This is because Egypt has the right to send aid direct to the Arab territories. The first consignment, 159 tonnes of food and medicine, was delivered. We are now considering sending a medical mission to treat the victims at hospitals.

Husayn: And why do you refuse to coordinate government support and popular support supervised by the Egyptian national committee for supporting the uprising, and why does the government oppose and voice reservations about the committee's proposals?

Al-Farnawani: I met with the committee's secretary general, journalist Lutfi al-Khuli, and some committee members. We agreed over government and popular cohesion in providing aid. We also agreed not to exploit the uprising for the purpose of settling internal disputes among Egyptian political parties. We informed the committees of the quarters that receive aid in the occupied

Arab territories, especially UNWRA. As for the reservations voiced over some of the committee's proposals, they concern the political leadership.

Husayn: More than 7 months have elapsed since the reopening of the PLO office in Cairo, but its representative has still not been appointed. Is Egypt imposing a "veto" on the PLO's choice, or are outstanding problems delaying such a decision?

Al-Farnawani: Egypt does not interfere in the PLO's internal affairs. The PLO must define its position and appoint whoever it wants; and the Egyptian leadership must welcome the appointee. It will respect and deal with him. Husayn: Why did the Egyptian Government refuse to exempt Palestinian students from paying this year's fees, despite the situation in the occupied territories?

Al-Farnawani: We asked the government to allow the students to enter the examinations without paying the fees on condition that their results not be announced until the problem is settled, especially with regard to the students whose source of income has ceased. The cause of the problem was that last year the PLO paid the education fees for nearly 200 Palestinian students studying under scholarships granted by the Egyptian Government, most of them from the Gaza Strip. On this basis those in charge of the Egyptian budget decided that all students should pay the fees. Thus a problem emerged. This is in addition to the economic situation facing Egypt at present.

Husayn: It is sometimes reported that the Palestinian presence in Egypt evokes Israeli opposition and protests. To what extent can such opposition and protests be accepted?

Al-Farnawani: They protest when some incidents occur, especially infiltration operations across the Egyptian borders. But Israel cannot interfere in our internal affairs. We reject this completely, even regarding the crossing of three Palestinian fedayeen, who Israel claimed had crossed the Egyptian borders to carry out the Negev desert operation. Egypt is not a policeman appointed to defend Israeli territory; there are multinational forces in Sinai under the 1979 treaty. Israel must defend the borders of the land it usurped; Egypt cannot secure such protection. Egypt rejects any interference in any of the Palestinian people's activities. And Israel does not have the right to submit a single word of protest because it knows in advance it would be rejected.

Husayn: Is there any political pressure on you, in your capacity as the head of the Palestine Department at the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, to meet with the Israeli ambassador?

Al-Farnawani: I have not so far met the Israel ambassador to Egypt. And I am not ready to receive or meet with him. This is a principled stand. I also refuse to make any

visit to Israel or the occupied territories under the Israeli occupation. I met with some Israeli figures in response to a request from the political leadership. I am among those who believe that what was taken by force can only be regained by force.

Egypt Readmitted to OAPEC Affiliate
NC1306125088 Cairo MENA in English
1200 GMT 13 Jun 88

[Text] The Arab Petroleum Investment Corporation (APICORP), an affiliate of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), has invited Egypt back to its ranks.

An APICORP statement, issued today upon a decision taken by the corporation's General Assembly meeting on Wednesday at Al-Khubar City in Saudi Arabia, readmitted Egypt into the fold and asked her to soonest appoint its representative on the board.

Jamal Hasan, head of the corporation's National Assembly and Saudi man on the board hailed the decision and said that the APICORP will resume financing petroleum and petrochemical projects in Egypt in consolidation of the joint Arab economic action.

Meanwhile, the agreement to found APICORP had been initialled here on July 1974, and Egypt contributes dollars twelve million to its capital.

EGYPT

'All' Israeli Politicians Reject Peace
JN1206063788 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic
10 Jun 88 p 4

[Editorial: "The Significance of this Event"]

[Text] The absence of 113 Israeli Knesset members and the attendance of only seven members during the vote on the U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz' peace plan, has more than one meaning that should always be kept in mind, especially at the present time when President Reagan's Administration seems to be making serious efforts to bring the viewpoints of the various parties to the Middle East conflict closer. This administration is now convinced about the idea of an international peace conference although it has different views regarding this conference.

Perhaps the most prominent meaning of what happened in the Knesset regarding Shultz initiative is that all Israel's parties adopt the same stand toward the U.S. plan which raises the land-for-peace slogan. This, once again, exposes the falseness of the hawks and doves legend among Israel's politicians, and proves that they all do not want any peace if its price is the return of the occupied Arab territories.

Another meaning is that the tactic used by Tel Aviv is mainly aimed at continuing the procrastination and time wasting during the half year left of President Reagan's second and last term in office. The next president and administration would need another year before they begin dealing with, studying, and adopting stands, vis-a-vis the Middle East problems.

If we add to this the fact that Michael Dukakis, after he guaranteed his nomination for the presidential elections by the Democratic Party, telephoned the Israeli Prime Minister Shamir to tell him that he will support his stand should he be elected president in November, we can explain the intransigent stands of Shamir and his colleagues regarding efforts to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially since the democrats are known for their resolute support for the Jewish state.

Parliamentarian Gives Views on U.S. Veto, Arab Relations

45040138 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
20 May 88 p 14

[Interview with Muhammad 'Abdallah, chairman of the People's Assembly Foreign Relations Committee, by AL-DUSTUR's Cairo office; date not given]

[Excerpts] Actions pursued by Egypt through its own political channels, specifically President Mubarak's visits to the United States, Europe, and the Arabian Gulf, raised more than one question in Arab and international communities, specifically because Egypt's action was taken at a sensitive stage in our Arab history. That stage is the stage of the brave uprising in Palestine and the happenings in the Gulf War. In addition, there is the role of Egypt's parliamentary action with its Arab brothers.

In Cairo, AL-DUSTUR raised these subjects with Dr Muhammad 'Abdallah, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in Egypt's People's Assembly. That is how the interview went.

No Break in Relations

[Question] Does Egypt have a plan for making a parliamentary move toward the Arab countries, now that diplomatic relations between Egypt and these countries have been officially restored?

[Answer] There was no break in relations; but superficial measures were taken. These measures had no effect on parliamentarians and on the people's forces in the Arab world; they did not feel that there was a break in relations. Egypt has bilateral parliamentary relations with Arab countries which have parliaments, and representatives of the People's Assembly in Egypt exchange visits with members of those parliaments. An Egyptian parliamentary delegation headed by Dr Rifat al-Mahjub, speaker of the People's Assembly, recently visited Iraq, and a delegation from Iraq's National Assembly, which was headed by Dr Sa'dun Hamadi,

speaker of the assembly, was received here in Egypt before diplomatic relations between Egypt and Iraq were restored. Last March a delegation from Jordan's House of Representatives headed by Mr 'Akif al-Fayiz, speaker of the House, visited Egypt. There is an arrangement with the Palestine National Council whose meetings we attend.

In addition, there are arrangements with fellow Arabs in the Federation of African Parliaments and with fellow Arabs who are members of the Federation of Arab Parliaments.

Thus, relations and systematic arrangements with fellow Arab parliamentarians continue on all levels.

The Federation of Arab Parliaments

[Question] What is the attitude that the People's Assembly in Egypt has now toward the Federation of Arab Parliaments?

[Answer] Egypt's membership in this federation is still suspended. The suspension is in accordance with the decision which was made by the federation in the wake of the Camp David Accords. Egypt, which founded this federation, welcomes and supports any joint Arab action. At the same time, however, it makes no effort to impose anything on those who are in charge in this federation. And yet, it is no secret to anyone that the federation lost its effectiveness after Egypt's membership in it was suspended.

Mubarak's Trip to the United States and to Europe

[Question] President Mubarak traveled to the United States and to Europe a short time after his trip to the Gulf states. What were the objectives of his trip to the United States and to Europe?

[Answer] The purpose of President Mubarak's trip to the United States and to Europe was to effect some movement in the political situation in the Middle East. Early in 1988, which is an election year in the United States and in Israel as well, that was especially important. It was feared that the Palestinian question might be put on ice in 1988 because of the U.S. presidential election. During a presidential election Jewish pressure groups apply more pressure on presidential candidates to win their support for Israel. That is why action to counter Israel's action was necessary. The effectiveness of Israel's action had to be reduced, and its results had to be checked. President Mubarak traveled to the United States and to Europe so that movement on the Palestinian question can be achieved, and 1988 would not become the year of the deadlock on the Palestinian question.

That is the premise for President Mubarak's trip to the United States and Europe. At the same time the region was experiencing significant circumstances and changes. The Palestinian uprising on the West Bank and in the

Gaza Strip and Israel's failure to suppress that uprising by force were the most important developments in the region. Consequently, international public opinion, particularly in the United States, felt that what was happening in the occupied territory was dangerous.

New Momentum

Another one of the trip's objectives was to provide a new momentum to the effort to apply Security Council Resolution 598 regarding putting an end to the war between Iraq and Iran. Pressure would be applied to Iran to make it accept that resolution and abide by it. The international community could be asked to take measures against Iran if it refuses to accept that resolution and yield to Security Council resolutions and international law.

An Ongoing Process

It must be clearly understood that the process of influencing the United States is an ongoing process. It would be inconceivable for people in the United States to change their position overnight and make a complete about face after listening to certain ideas and opinions or to an Egyptian plan or initiative that adopts a practical approach to bring the parties closer to an international peace conference. It is also inconceivable that public opinion, the administration, or the media in the United States will change that much. Matters are not seen as either black or white, nor can a one-dimensional approach be taken.

Public opinion in the United States and in Europe sympathized with the struggle of the Palestinian people, which was manifested in the uprising. That is indisputable. We are trying to use this sympathy to gain political advantage, and that effort complements the Palestinian people's struggle. But it is wrong to think that the superpowers' interests and directions will change overnight. Such thinking is misguided, and it lacks scientific accuracy.

Egypt Condemns the American Veto

Egypt's attitude toward the U.S. veto of the Security Council Resolution condemning Israel's repressive policy on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip affirmed Egypt's rejection of all U.S. justifications for vetoing the UN Security Council resolution. It was Israel's repressive policy on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that led to the current uprising of the Palestinian people. As Arabs we regret the American position. Arabs must make the United States know that they are not pleased with that position. However, we must not ignore the role that pressure groups played in making that veto. At the same time we cannot consider that position to be one that nullifies the results of President Mubarak's visit to the United States.

There is no doubt that the Arab nation has been employing a new approach since the Amman Summit which was held last November. That approach involves more cooperation, more coordination, and a minimum of Arab consensus. All that gives Arabs and the Arab nation added international clout and more tools to work with. Enough time has been lost in inter-Arab disputes and conflicts.

The Amman conference produced for the Arab nation an Arab approach to peace. Egypt is providing the strongest support for that approach to peace in the Gulf, and it is supporting the international peace conference as the way to achieve peace for the Palestinian cause.

Egypt's Parliamentary Action

[Question] Does Egypt have a plan to use parliamentary action to strengthen Egyptian-international relations and set the stage for President Mubarak's initiative?

[Answer] We started working on this plan a long time ago. The People's Assembly in Egypt is the only non-European parliamentary body which managed to set up systems and norms for its relationship with Europe's Parliamentary Council. This is the parliamentary body in which European countries participate. A discussion of the Gulf War and the Middle East was scheduled on the council's agenda during its previous session.

We took action through the Federation of African Parliaments and through the Parliamentary Federation of French-Speaking Countries.

At the present time we are making preparations for a delegation from Egypt's People's Assembly to visit the United States. This delegation will visit the United States to conduct extensive talks with members of the U.S. Congress on the question of our Arab nation and the U.S. position on that question. In addition to all that, Egypt is involved in ongoing exchange programs which allow Egyptians to travel to many Arab countries and people from those countries to visit Egypt. Egypt's parliamentary action was never halted because popular diplomacy complements official diplomacy. We know how decisions are made in the United States and in the other superpowers, and we are trying to influence that decision making process in favor of our nation.

08592

Fundamentalists Reportedly Threaten Freedom of Expression

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 7 May 88 pp 24, 25

[Article by Yusuf al-'Aqid: "Egyptian Traditionalists: Art is Immoral"]

[Text] Is it reasonable that in the final years of the twentieth century, Egypt would have to prove beyond a doubt to certain extremist groups that art is not immoral but permissible?

And is it reasonable that this should go on at a time when the Egyptian Government does not see any problem other than the economic situation, with all its breakdowns, and that discussions with the International Monetary Fund should take priority over other issues, and that this government should refuse to believe that there are other problems and diverse issues in Egypt that threaten the activity of the nation?!

And is it reasonable that the political opposition in Egypt would not see any problem other than the issues of democracy and political action, to the extent that the primary concern in the opinion of this opposition is the existence of the emergency law? Of course the existence of such a law is a problem, but it does not surpass the many other problems, especially since the extremist groups will not for a single moment differentiate between the government and the opposition.

Then is it not strange that the government would take a stance on this issue that is more progressive than that of some factions of the Egyptian opposition, especially that represented by the Socialist Labor Party and AL-SHA'B newspaper?!

What is going on in Egypt has not suddenly appeared, but it has mushroomed in an attempt to exploit the religious atmosphere of the blessed month of Ramadan. What is going on began during Sadat's time, when groups proclaiming extremist religious slogans increased in strength in Egypt's universities.

What happened recently is that the College of Liberal Arts at Cairo University put together a performance for the graduates, but the extremist groups interfered with chains, daggers, and knives in order to prevent the performance, because art is immoral. Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Hammudah, dean of liberal arts at Cairo, was forced to cancel the performance fearing a clash with these groups. In fact, it became known afterwards that the dean had entered into negotiations with those groups, that reached the point that they demanded to see the words of the songs that were to be sung during the performance.

In Upper Egypt, in the village of Kudyat al-Islam to be specific, the hall of culture belonging to the Egyptian Ministry of Culture was putting on the play "The Alternate," which talks about the Egyptian farmer leaving his land and emigrating from Egypt. These extremist groups attacked the dramatic performance and stopped it by force. A young man from the village was killed in the melee, and a number of those attending were injured. Even though those who attacked the performance had refused even to see it, they proclaimed that as long as it was a play it had to be about naked women, that it was immoral, and that it had to be stopped in any way possible.

When the National Circus travelled to Upper Egypt to perform in the city of al-Minya, it was forced to put on its performances under armed protection, lest it be attacked by extremist groups.

In fact, it has reached the point that some of these groups oppose the teaching of the literary works of Tawfiq al-Hakim and Taha Husayn in colleges of art, because they turned out dramatic and fictional art, which is immoral.

The campaign has gone beyond that, since the extremist groups have proclaimed that music is immoral, that cinema is straying from the truth, and that art in general is a kind of departure from religion.

And while these groups are saying such things and putting them into effect immediately, the government is content merely to react. It waits until they start to do something, then it reacts to this act or that.

Even in reacting, the government does not have one position for confronting extremist acts, but rather just applications here and there.

The opposition maintains absolute silence in this battle. In fact, some of its factions are with these extremist groups, and that is what makes the government's position on precisely this issue more advanced and progressive than that of the opposition.

Incidents have escalated: the Muhammad Najm theater was burned, and efforts have been made to contact artists to get them to get out of art, and some of these efforts have been successful.

The artist Hasan Yusuf, husband of the artist Shams al-Badawi who retired from art, turned his film production studio into a bookstore selling books on the religious heritage. The artist Hana' Tharwat and her husband the artist Muhammad al-'Arabi turned from art to selling jewelry in a shop owned by a company that gets its money from depositors saving on a religious basis.

The great artist Shadiyah retired suddenly from art, and she also retired from public life. Indeed, those artists who have not gotten out of art have been approached by parties linked to those groups about retiring from art. The latest of these approaches was made to the artist Salah Qabil, who immediately rejected the demand made of him.

AL-SHA'B newspaper, which is published by the Socialist Labor Party, for its part launched a detrimental campaign against the novel "Who Killed Moliro" by a Latin American novelist named Vargas (Ayosa?), and which had been translated by Dr Hamid Abu-Ahmad, a professor about Spain in al-Azhar University. The newspaper demanded that this novel be banned, and it tried to get the illustrious Azhar and the Egyptian Ministry of Culture to support banning the novel, because there were

some simple romantic scenes in it. Dr Samir Sirhan, head of the book agency that published the novel, refused to respond to this campaign or to ban the novel.

Opposing the assault on the novel were Jamal al-Ghaytani in the newspaper AL-AKHBAR, and Dr Fathi 'Abd-al-Fattah and Kamal al-Qalash in the newspaper AL-JUMHURIYAH. In responding to this attack, the newspaper AL-SHA'B took a position which in fact involves a certain amount of political opportunism, rather than ideology and principle, since the newspaper is wooing one of the powers which is wagering on the entire future of Egypt.

The campaign against art has been attacked by a number of intellectuals and writers, so much so that Ahmad Baha'-al-Din wrote in AL-AHRAM demanding that art be produced, even if that had to be done under the armed guard of tanks.

In AL-MUSAWWAR, the literary critic Raja' al-Naqash wrote about the position of religion towards art, and the music historian Kamal al-Najmi wrote about music and song in Arab civilization and the role that art had played in this phase.

Mukarram Muhammad Ahmad, editor in chief of AL-MUSAWWAR, wrote a political article on this phenomenon in which he said: "What is happening in the university today is but a rehearsal for what could happen tomorrow in society. A nation without arts is a nation without feelings, and a nation without feelings is half-way to becoming a nation without a mind." Moreover he says: "If the elite of the nation do not rise above the futile farce of partisan games in Egypt to defend Egypt's right to preserve the treasures of its feelings, then danger is on its way, no doubt about it."

In a brave move, the artist 'Adil Imam decided to head for the village of Kudyat al-Islam, where extremist groups had prevented popular culture from being performed, in order to give a performance of the play "Legacy of the Wind," and he announced his plan in an interview with the magazine AL-MUSAWWAR.

The issue currently at stake is not whether there will be art in Egypt or not. Rather, the question is whether Egypt will be or not. For this battle over art is just a beginning, or a test of strength of a particular kind, from which these groups could move on to matters greater than art.

The artist Ma'ali Zayid believes that there must be collective action by artists, and that the matter is extremely serious, extending beyond art to have a harmful effect on the future of life throughout Egypt.

However, the following can be noted about this battle:

1. Everyone is debating obvious truths that should not be debated in the first place. The first of these obvious truths is: is art permitted or forbidden by religion? The

mere discussion of this issue gives a certain amount of legitimacy to those who bring up the question of issues that should not be questioned in the first place.

What is ludicrous is that those who defend the legitimacy of art have begun to look for examples and anecdotes. . . but just debating certain issues that are obvious facts involves risk.

2. Those who take the side of art write and speak from a position of defending art, as if there were some accusation that could be brought against art. Whoever speaks from a defensive position must admit that some accusation has been made against him. Whoever puts himself in a defensive position has surrendered to the accusations of others against him.

3. It must be recognized that a state of indifference exists in the ordinary man in the street, who seems to be wrapped up in the many assaults of daily living, and has not yet realized the danger that could threaten all aspects of life in Egypt.

12547

Muslim Brotherhood Figure Discusses Group's Role in Society

*45040136 Kuwait AL-MUJTAMA' in Arabic
3 May 88 pp 20-21*

[Interview with Mr Mustafa Mashhur, deputy for the Muslim Brotherhood's supreme guide; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] In his interview with AL-MUJTAMA' His Eminence Mr Mustafa Mashhur, deputy for the Muslim Brotherhood's supreme guide, answered a number of questions that are of interest to followers of the Islamic Movement who are watching the group's development in Egypt. They are also watching its accomplishments, its programs and its objectives. The text of the interview follows.

[Question] Recently the People's Assembly in Egypt enacted a law which extends the state of emergency in the country for 3 more years. Is the future of democracy in Egypt in jeopardy?

[Answer] A state of emergency was declared for 1 year after former President Anwar al-Sadat was assassinated. Reasons were made up to extend the state of emergency again and again. This time the state of emergency was extended to a 3-year term.

You ask if extending the state of emergency has created any feelings of apprehension. Actually, feelings of apprehension are generated when people have liberties to enjoy and then someone who fears those liberties takes them away with such a law. But the liberties which

people have are limited, and they are especially manifested in the press and in what is published in newspapers. It is hoped that the press will not be subjected to new pressures or restrictions.

I believe there is no justification for the state of emergency. It offers us neither security nor stability, and its negative effects on the country outnumber the positive effects. It is only with freedom and security that we can develop the country, develop its citizens, put their energies to work, unleash their talents, increase production, achieve self-sufficiency, and get rid of any subordination.

[Question] We receive many letters inquiring about AL-DA'WAH, the Muslim Brotherhood's magazine. The question that comes to mind is this: Will it be published in the near future, or will LIWA' AL-ISLAM Magazine continue to be a substitute for AL-DA'WAH Magazine, which it is at the present time?

[Answer] During former President Anwar al-Sadat's administration a law which was especially written for AL-DA'WAH and AL-I'TISAM magazines was issued. It stipulated that a permit issued to allow publication of a magazine which is owned by one or more individuals expired with the owners' death. AL-DA'WAH's permit expired when the late al-Hajj Salih 'Ashmawi died. However, al-Shaykh Ahmad 'Ashur, who holds the permit for AL-I'TISAM Magazine is still alive. That law stipulated that 100 persons had to form a company to publish a magazine, and despite all the obstacles which were placed in their way, the Muslim Brotherhood established a company. But the Department for Companies at the Ministry of the Economy dragged its feet for a long time about giving its approval for the establishment of the company. It filed cases in court against the company, and as time went by 3 of the 100 founders died and were replaced by 3 others. Necessary measures to complete the registration of the company are still incomplete. The company must then apply to the Supreme Press Council for a permit to publish the magazine. If the council approves the publication of the magazine, it will be published, God willing. If it refuses, we will file a suit in court against the council, and with God's help we will try to win it. At the present time LIWA' AL-ISLAM Magazine is being published. It too is being published after court disputes, and it is considered a substitute for AL-DA'WAH Magazine until God grants us the opportunity to resume publication of that magazine.

[Question] Numerous statements which were made recently on the political scene affirmed that the Muslim Brotherhood would soon establish a political party. Some of these statements were made by leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood. What do you have to say about these statements? How much progress has been achieved in the effort to establish this party?

[Answer] The election law, which was issued so that people would vote for a list of candidates, was designed to keep the Muslim Brotherhood out of the elections. The law restricted the elections to officially recognized political parties. This forced the late Mr 'Umar al-Talmasani and his colleagues in the Muslim Brotherhood to run in the 1984 elections as members of the Wafd Party. Then, Muslim Brothers thought about establishing a political party for members of their society to give them an opportunity to run in the elections as members of that party. Studies were made to write the party's program, and that is almost complete. Afterwards, the Muslim Brothers will take the society's program to the Committee for Political Parties and request its approval. If the committee does not approve, a lawsuit will be filed against the Committee for Political Parties.

[Question] You recently attended the Nation's Unity Conference which was held in Pakistan. Many leaders of Islamic Movements also attended that conference. Conference observers affirm that it was biased in Iran's favor. Is that true? If it is true, how can leaders of Islamic movements attend such conferences without ascertaining the identity of the conference hosts?

[Answer] Europe's Islamic Council, which is chaired by Dr Salim 'Azzam, held several conferences in the past about Islamic issues that were general and useful. The late Mr 'Umar al-Talmasani was invited to attend, and I joined him in attending some of these conferences. None of these conferences had been biased. Recently Mr Muhammad Hamid Abu-al-Nasr, the Muslim Brotherhood's supreme guide, and I received invitations to attend a conference on the unity of the Islamic nation. Because the Muslim Brotherhood is interested in that subject and because there was no reason to keep us from accepting that invitation, we attended the conference and participated in the discussion. The conference was attended by a large number of leaders of Islamic movements in the world. Some of them were from Iran. Dr 'Abdallah al-Turk delivered a message on behalf of King Fahd. The supreme guide requested a copy of the conference resolutions so he could express his opinion on them before they were announced. We were then taken by surprise when the resolutions were read before we had given our approval to them. They were also read in English. The supreme guide expressed his opposition to the chairman of the session, and he requested that the resolutions be read in Arabic, but they were not. His eminence, the supreme guide was furious when the meeting was adjourned, and he rebuked the chairman of the meeting for his conduct. We expressed our displeasure with such conduct, and some of the conferees joined us in expressing their displeasure too.

A few speakers at the conference condemned Iraq, considering it the aggressor in its war with Iran. Some speakers also condemned Iran because of its refusal to end the war. His eminence, the supreme guide met with

a few of Iran's representatives, and he asked them to end this war and this bloodshed, which are costing Muslims their lives. But his request went unanswered.

[Question] Today, many Islamic groups are active on the Egyptian scene. In addition, there is the original Muslim Brotherhood Movement. Do you think the Muslim Brotherhood is responsible for the growth of these Islamic groups?

[Answer] Egypt has old, traditional, Islamic groups, such as the Legal Society, Supporters of the Prophetic Tradition, Young Muslim Men, Muhammad's Clan, and others. All of them are involved in issues which are partially related to religion. The Muslim Brotherhood Society is a broad society whose goals are known to all. Young people had already adopted some of its principles by the time the Muslim Brotherhood was subjected to hardship and difficulty. Its members were thrown in prison and detention camps; the society was subjected to campaigns that aroused doubts and suspicions about it; and it was restricted during 'Abd-al-Nasir's administration. While the Muslim Brothers were in prison, young people found no one to give them guidance and direction. Thus, some groups emerged around certain individuals, ideas, or methods of action. Some of these groups grew without any control or guidance from experienced people. That is how these groups originated. The Muslim Brotherhood is not responsible for their growth. Muslim Brothers are striving to unify Muslims and to join forces with others to serve the cause of Islamic action.

[Question] Do you believe in the parliamentary method as a means of achieving objectives? Do you believe in the feasibility of western democracy?

[Answer] Muslim Brothers do not consider winning seats in parliament to be the sanctioned way to achieve goals, but they use their presence in parliament as a tool to spread Islam and to proclaim it from a platform which gives them special immunity. Muslim Brothers view parliament in this manner at a time when restrictions have been placed on them by that so-called resolution to disband their group and to prevent all its activities by law. To achieve its objectives, the Muslim Brotherhood Society follows its own course, which was set by the late Imam Hasan al-Banna who derived that course from the tradition of the prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation. It is a course that adopts preaching the message of Islam and educating and developing Muslim individuals, families and societies. A solid Islamic foundation can thus be formed, and a stable Islamic government can be built on that foundation. It is such a government that can preserve a regime's commitment to God's laws.

Government interacts with this Islamic foundation during the Islamic process of giving counsel and advice, and both parties work together, avoiding negligence or indulgence, to apply God's laws. In Islam an advisory council may issue its opinions on how God's provisions are to be

applied in accordance with society's circumstances. But these opinions must not conflict with the clear letter of the law. The advisory council may not enact laws that contradict God's laws.

Muslim Brothers do not believe in the feasibility of western democracy which gives parliamentary councils the right to make laws. Western democracy considers people the source of authority. We saw an aberration of that view when British Parliament decriminalized homosexuality. Recently, we heard that the Knesset also decriminalized homosexuality.

[Question] The question of putting the canonical laws of Islam into practice in Egypt is still being discussed, and the discussion is going nowhere because the ruling party in Egypt controls a majority of the seats in parliament. What is the use then of having the Muslim Brothers' representatives in parliament if any law to be issued has to be approved by the majority?

[Answer] As I mentioned in my answer to the previous question, Muslim Brothers did not enter parliament thinking that their presence there was the only means by which the application of Islamic law can be achieved. To the Muslim Brothers being in parliament is a means by which people can be educated about Islam, and Islamic systems and laws made clear to them. The Muslim Brothers want to show Islam as the one and only ideal solution to all issues which all branches of society are dealing with. Islam lacks nothing because it was created by God, the Creator of all people, the Omniscient God who understands people and knows what is good and useful for them.

The education which is required includes creating the conviction that all man-made systems failed to make people happy and to provide them with security and assurance. Government must abandon these man-made principles, such as socialism or other isms, and it must return to Islam, the true religion.

We do not really expect that the parliamentary majority, which is represented by the representatives of the ruling party, will approve the application of the canonical laws of Islam. But representatives of the Islamic Coalition will get public opinion on their side as they set forth the Islamic solution to society's problems, and the public will prefer the canonical laws of Islam. The government and its party will appear isolated from society and its interests, and people will lose confidence in the government unless it changes its ways and accepts the canonical laws of Islam as a system of government.

Shaykh Jad-al-Haqq Discusses Islam's Role in Government, Justice

45040131 Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic
6 May 88 pp 56-57

[Interview with Shaykh Jad-al-Haqq 'Ali Jad-al-Haqq, grand Imam of al-Azhar by Muhammad Bakr: "Freedom Has Its Controls, Dialogue Has Its Conditions;" date and place of interview not given]

[Excerpts]

The Canonical Law of Islam and Disputes

[Question] Will the application of Islam's canonical laws put an end to conflicts and court disputes?

[Answer] Such controversies would end if, as I said, the responsibility for applying Islam's canonical laws were entrusted to individuals first and then to those who are in charge. The canonical laws of Islam are not merely a code of laws, nor are they legal decisions made by a judicial authority. Every individual is responsible for observing these laws in his relationship with God and in his relationship with society. These laws are used by the courts when they settle a case that was brought to them. It would be better for us to try putting an end to such court disputes, and the only way we can do that is to apply the canonical laws of Islam and assume personal responsibility for observing them.

The canonical laws of Islam govern all these aspects and tendencies. The nation must start applying those laws which it can apply. If as much compatibility as possible cannot be achieved when the canonical laws are applied in all areas, the favorable outcome of applying Islamic law will not appear promptly. In fact, some of the laws which had already been applied or the judgments which were made in accordance with Islam's canonical laws may be lost amidst those decisions which were made without due consideration of Islamic laws.

[Question] If the canonical laws of Islam are applied in Islamic countries, what guarantees can be provided to ensure that conditions are being met when legally prescribed punishments are handed down?

[Answer] This is part of what we call the penal code, which is a tool that is used to reform society and make it safe and secure. According to scholars of jurisprudence, it consists of restraints. This means that legally prescribed punishments in Islam, and even part of the penal code, were intended to set up restraints and prevent some members of society from lapsing into crime. Confidence in the judge and in his qualifications to apply and observe the conditions of the Islamic penal code properly are the guarantees which can be provided to ensure that conditions are met when legally prescribed punishments are applied. Islam prescribed legal punishments and other penalties, and it prescribed the role that judges had to play: they were to settle disputes in

accordance with the general principle of justice. If someone who is not a judge is entrusted with that task, the fault does not lie with the law, any law. It rather lies with whomever entrusted a task to someone who was not qualified to do it. Our virtuous ancestors were known to express their preference for an imam who might err on the side of forgiveness than one who might err on the side of punishment. This is what judges should bear in mind. In a case where a crime was committed, a person should be considered innocent until he is proven guilty because he is presumed to be innocent.

[Question] Some people are calling for the immediate application of Islamic laws, but some people are calling for their gradual application. What do you think, Your Eminence?

[Answer] The two parts of the canonical laws of Islam, the doctrine and the code of laws, undoubtedly complement each other. These are matters which are evident and unequivocal. They are derived primarily from the Holy Koran and the prophet's tradition. With God's help they have been preserved in them. Gradual application of the law differs from gradual enactment of the law. The law exists. Some people think, however, that Islamic laws ought to be applied gradually because Islamic society went through long periods of time during which these Islamic laws were not applied. This would undoubtedly be a good approach, but it must be applied in all areas evenly and under all conditions equally. For example, we must not limit our use of that approach to the application of punishment and refuse to apply it to rectify business transactions. We must not focus exclusively on conduct and good manners and in doing so not abide by rules and regulations. Instead, we must approach the application of Islamic law in all areas in an even and balanced manner.

Seeking Counsel in Islam

[Question] What is the aim of seeking and giving counsel in Islam? Can that practice replace political parties?

[Answer] If we were to examine what is mentioned in the Holy Koran about seeking counsel and if we were to consider how God's messenger, may God bless him and grant him salvation, counseled his companions on some matters, we would see that the aim of seeking counsel is to arrive at what the preponderance of opinion deems to be correct and proper. If that is the case, then it is evident that the course which should be followed is that which the preponderance of opinion concluded was proper and correct after counsel and advice were given.

That is why I support the view which says that he who seeks the counsel of others should be bound by the outcome of the counsel he sought. I do not support the other view which states that one may seek counsel for its own sake. There is nothing in Islam which bars the establishment of parties which counsel and advise, but the parties we are talking about here are those whose

purpose is to give counsel and advice, not to fulfill partisan purposes. After the prophet's death, may God bless him and grant him salvation, selecting the first successor, Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, may God be pleased with him was the first reason for having a partisan debate. At that time, knowledgeable Muslims, who were the prophet's companions, met in Saqifah Bani Sa'idah, and conflicting statements and suggestions were made. After everyone had expressed his opinion and matters had become clear, 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, may God be pleased with him, told Abu Bakr, may God be pleased with him, "You have my support in good times and in bad times. You were chosen for our religion by God's messenger, may God bless him and grant him salvation. How can we not choose you our leader in this world?" 'Umar thus declared his support for Abu Bakr's succession, and everyone, those who supported Abu Bakr's succession as well as those who did not, declared his support for him too. This means that it is desirable to have a dialogue between those who subscribe to different opinions so that what is proper and correct can be achieved. This is the essence of giving and seeking counsel. If political parties are established, they should actually counsel and advise so that opinions are given and expressed for the purpose of achieving what is right. Islam most certainly does not bar the establishment of such political parties.

[Question] What is the difference between giving and seeking counsel and democracy?

[Answer] The term, democracy, was introduced into Islamic society and used to refer to certain concepts in western societies. The Koran talked about counsel when it advised the Islamic nation to seek the counsel of others. The Koran tells the messenger, may God bless him and grant him salvation, "Take counsel with them in the conduct of affairs" [al-Imran: 159], and it promises rewards to those who "conduct their affairs by mutual consent" [al-Shura: 38]. In my judgment this process affords an opportunity for honest and honorable dialogue which is more precise and more far-reaching than that which democracy provides. It leads to proper decisions on issues or matters which are the subject of the counsel which is being sought. One must not compare this Islamic system of counseling and advising with any other system which was prevalent in the past or is prevalent now. The origins of this system and the explanations provided for it by Muslim jurists show that it is appropriate for the climate of Muslim countries and the people in those countries who are involved in putting Islam into practice.

Conditions for Freedom of Thought and Speech

[Question] Some people think that people must have complete and total freedom to say what they think. What are the conditions for dialogue, and what are the boundaries that must be drawn for the freedom to say what one thinks so that dialogue can be conducted in a serious vein and something can be gained by the freedom to say what one thinks?

[Answer] People misconstrue the meaning of freedom of thought. If freedom of thought is not placed in its proper framework, chaos ensues, and freedom is eventually lost. For example, discussions about the doctrine should be clear and unequivocal. This means that those who talk about the doctrine must be well-informed and knowledgeable about their subject. A dialogue on any subject must be conducted by those who are qualified and experienced in the subject they are discussing. People who are not qualified to talk about a certain subject should not become involved. For example, only physicians should be involved in issues which deal with medicine. If it is an issue in experimental science, only those who are involved in that science should be involved in that discussion. If the discussion is about what we call the law, jurists are the ones who should be involved in it. If the discussion has to do with deriving a legal judgment from its original source in the canonical laws of Islam, those involved in that dialogue ought to be well-informed about the rules and origins of Islamic law. We have to address society as an Islamic society whose course has to be rectified.

This is what the canonical laws of Islam say. The Holy Koran said as much when God Almighty said, "It is not right that all the faithful should go to war at once. A band from each community should stay behind to instruct themselves in religion and admonish their men when they return, so that they may take heed" [al-Tawbah: 122]. The purpose of this principle is to control or regulate the rules of specialization which show us the proper way in which an earnest dialogue can be conducted.

[Question] How can one prepare a clear, unambiguous outline which can be used to talk to people about religion in a manner which is more advanced and not at all intolerant?

[Answer] When advocating righteousness and reform preachers must be guided by the decorum suggested in the Koran. They themselves are to be guided by the Koran and its style. They can thus confront the problems of the age in a manner which people would find acceptable and appealing. They must first declare to people what these problems are before overwhelming them with accounts of the different kinds of torture God has in store for those who disobey Him. After all, that is how the Koran described Muhammad's mission when God said, "We have sent you forth as a blessing to mankind" [al-Anbiya': 107]. The blessing, which is characteristic of this mission, must be evident in everything, even when one is preaching. Making something attractive and desirable is always preferable to making it terrifying. Reward must always be offered before punishment, especially to this nation which God did bless by delaying its punishment and expediting its reward. Preachers must also bring good tidings to people, and they must not alienate them. They must make religious provisions clear to people, and then they must warn violators. This is the way of the Koran, and that is what the messenger, may

God bless him and grant him salvation, practiced. "Bring good tidings to people and do not alienate them. Do what is right and proper and bring people closer together."

08592

Opposition Leaders Prepare for People's Assembly Elections

45040143b Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
2 June 88 p 6

[Text] The five Egyptian opposition parties are continuing their joint work in preparation for local elections under the local administration law in which the government adheres to maintaining the system of party absolute list.

In one development, leaders and leadership of the opposition parties in the People's Assembly participated in the first meetings of the Assembly's local government committee which began its debates last Saturday in order to discuss the new bill. Some 20 members attended the meetings headed by deputies Ibrahim Shukri, al-Ma'mun al-Hudaybi, Syaf al-Islam Hasan al-Banna, and 'Ali Salamah. The opposition deputies expressed their objection to the absolute list system.

In another development, Liberal Party leader Mustafa Kamil Murad said that opposition leaders' meetings during the last 3 weeks have led to all the opposition parties agreeing to participate in the coming elections and to prepare for them immediately for fear that the government might schedule the elections for July instead of holding them as scheduled in September.

The Liberal Party leader said that the opposition leaders have set up two committees in order to follow up the preparations that are being made. One is a legal committee whose task is to follow up the discussions under way regarding the new bill in order to uncover the unconstitutional aspects in the absolute lists system in the light of the report which the commissioners body at the State Council prepared and which contested the constitutionality of this system (on the occasion of contesting the Consultative Council election law before the Higher Constitutional Court). This is also because combining the absolute list system with the individual seat system represents a serious violation of the principle of equality among citizens as provided by the constitution. This could lead to contesting the constitutionality of the impending local administration law in case the government adheres to its stands on it.

In addition to the legal committee the opposition leaders have also set up a higher political committee under their chairmanship which will set up a number of provincial political committees in order to select the opposition candidates and coordinate between those candidates who are now being selected.

In addition to what the Liberal Party leader has said, there have been reports that the Moslem Brotherhood intends to enter the elections on the basis of individual seats, leaving the list system to the opposition, according to former Wafdist deputy Mustafa Naji who broke away from Fu'ad Saraj-al-Din. Naji expressed his belief that the genuine Wafdist in the provinces will not agree to make publicity for the other opposition parties.

But official Wafd Party sources said that although coalition is not one the Wafd's political programs, yet the party at present feels itself compelled to work according to this method in view of the government's insistence on maintaining the emergency law and the absolute list system.

These sources believe that only two political tendencies now exist among the Egyptian public; one is the organized religious tendency and the other is what they call the liberal one. As for the rest of the parties, they believe that they have no standing or a popular base. This is what prompts them to believe that the opposition lists will consist of a mixture of these parties while dominance in these lists will be for the Wafd Party, in view of the number of required candidates in the local districts which will reach 25,000. They further say that since the opposition party leaders agreed that each list should bear the name of the party that has the largest representation in the constituency, then the majority of the lists will bear the Wafd Party's name while they do not expect the rest of the parties to be more than about 20 constituencies out of approximately 2,500 constituency.

The majority of sources of the various party do not expect any problems to arise over the name of the party leading the list or the proportion of candidates in each list because of the large number of candidates and because the arrangement of the absolute lists will be unimportant because either the list will win as a whole or all its candidates will lose.

13305

Opposition Leaders Discuss Foreign Investment Legislation

45040116 Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
28 Apr 88 p 6

[Article by Muhammad Yusuf al-Masri]

[Text] The "emergency law battle" and its ramifications have resulted in three important national and legislative issues being put on the backburner of partisan concern, even though some people believe that these issues should have been accorded greater partisan attention.

In the last few weeks, the People's Assembly passed a law allowing Arab and foreign citizens to own condominiums and real estate. Two other laws yet to be passed have raised great controversy: a bill regulating investment

companies and another bill allowing foreign investors, both Arab and foreigner, to own Egyptian land they plan to reclaim for agricultural production.

AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI raised these three issues with the opposition parties to find out where they stand on them.

Mr Ibrahim Faraj, secretary general of the Wafd Party:

(1) Based on prevailing conditions, we cannot rule for or against investment companies. We do not know how these companies came into existence and we are not familiar with the nature of their activities.

However, the indisputable issue in our opinion is the need for strict oversight to disclose the nature of these companies' activities, to set limits for them and to subject them to statutory provisions that serve the country's overall interest and guarantee their clients' investments. But to allow these companies to be governed by advertisements and publicity is something that no loyal citizen can accept.

(2) About Arabs and foreigners owning condominiums and real estate, we support and encourage this law because there is no harm in these people living in apartments they purchase, provided they pay for them in foreign currency.

(3) As for ownership of agricultural, or even desert land, we are against this measure because it takes us back to the past when foreign individuals and companies owned one-third of Egyptian land. Land is a symbol of sovereignty and it must never be allowed to get out of Egyptian hands. Nonetheless, there is no objection to setting up investment companies, even with foreign money, for land reclamation but not for ownership.

Engineer Ibrahim Shukri, leader of the Labor Party:

(1) We believe that what needs to be done now is to encourage people with savings to channel their money to projects that may take the form of public or private corporations.

Accordingly, we must create a climate that enhances confidence in the investment field in general. With respect to investment companies, they are not all alike, and there may be certain deficiencies in certain companies whose activities may be regulated. However, we do not support banning these companies. We support good investment of money deposited with them. In practical terms, we must consider the fact that a few million citizens depend on these companies for investment of their savings.

(2) Regarding the law allowing Arab and foreign nationals to own condominiums and real estate, we noticed that the law treats Arabs and foreigners equally and,

therefore, we expressed our reservations. This law helps Arab investors to get on with their business, but when it comes to foreign investors, it may create difficulties we do not need.

We also noticed that the law the government sent to the People's Assembly was better when it went in than when it came out, because the government stipulated that construction begin within 6 years or the contract would be cancelled. Instead, the assembly allowed continued ownership without construction at an annual increase of 2 percent, up to 10 percent. This opens the door to speculation in vacant land, especially since the annual rate of inflation is between 10 and 15 percent, thus rendering the 2 percent rate insignificant.

(3) Regarding the bill the government is now drafting, it revolves around investors' ownership of new and desert land. The law gives Arabs the right to enjoy the same privileges as Egyptians and encourages them to go into this field, the most difficult of all investment fields. Hence, we have approved this law in principle.

Mr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Shafi, secretary general of the Liberal Party:

(1) We say, at the top of our voice, do not tamper with investment companies, the large corporations in particular. They are the only ones in Egypt who absorb and invest Egyptian savings, instead of going for consumption, and they assimilate part of the labor force.

We believe that tampering with these companies would create a critical upturn in the national economy and in social relations, particularly since investments in these companies are estimated in millions.

We also believe that these are regular companies that maintain aboveboard relations with their clients. No citizen has complained that these companies have cheated him out of his money.

(2) We in the Liberal Party welcome Arab and foreign investments in Egypt and it does not make sense to deny them residency. However, we wish that they would purchase land outside the housing bloc because these investors can afford to build there.

(3) Even though the law allowing foreign investors to own desert land they plan to reclaim is still under discussion, the Liberal Party supports large investments in the desert but not in new and old land. This, in any event, is beneficial to the national economy, and this kind of ownership is not to be feared because all property owners would own Egyptian land under Egyptian law.

Mr Lutfi Wakid, NPUG central committee member:

(1) If these (investment) companies are subject to law and to audit, and pay taxes and operate within the framework of production needed for society and not for consumption that squanders society's wealth, then they are welcome.

However, companies engaged in smuggling and dealing in consumer goods and usury cannot be good for society.

(2) Regarding ownership of reclaimed land, this is a dangerous law. It allows exploitation of foreign investors by leasing them land they plan to reclaim, for there is more to land ownership than the economic dimension: it has political and social dimensions as well. Therefore, land ownership by foreigners would open the door to problems we do not need.

12502

Journalist Cited on Egyptian Bases on Libyan Border

NC1306085488 Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic
11 Jun 88 p 12

[Text] Husayn 'Abd-al-Raziq, former chief editor of the Cairo newspaper AL-AHALI, has verified remarks by Colonel Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi in an interview with the newspaper to the effect that Egypt has three military bases along the Libyan border.

'Abd-al-Raziq said that William Casey, late CIA director, came to Cairo twice after this interview to try to convince the Egyptian Government to join U.S. forces in launching an attack on Libya.

Speaking at a symposium organized by the Freedoms Committee of the Journalists' Association about his work on AL-AHALI, 'Abd-al-Raziq said that the Egyptian Government reacted to the paper's publishing of a chapter of Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal's "The Autumn of Fury" by threatening harsh measures against the paper if it published other parts of the book.

The paper circumvented the problem, he said, by publishing an interview with Haykal in which he addressed the basic points of his book.

Interpol's Help Sought In Arresting Organization Members

NC1506062888 Cairo MENA in Arabic
1950 GMT 14 Jun 88

[Text] MENA has learned that Egyptian security authorities will contact Interpol to arrest members of the clandestine organizations unveiled here today and who are still at large abroad as soon as the interrogations by the state security higher prosecution are over.

The following members of the organization are still at large: Isma'il Salih Muhammad, a Kuwaiti national; Muhammad Mughanniyah and Zayd Farahat, Lebanese;

Nasim Ahmad 'Ali, a Kuwaiti; Muhammad Hasan al-'Abbasi and Muhammad Fikri al-Shahabi, Bahrainis; Fu'ad 'Isam, a Palestinian; and Muhammad Ahmad 'Anbar, Husayn 'Ali Husayn, and Hani 'Adil Mahmud, all Egyptians.

Commentator Links Crisis in Electricity Shortage, Democracy

45040128 Cairo UKTUBAR in Arabic 8 May 88 pp 3-6

[Article by Salah Muntasir: "Before the Lights Are Extinguished and Democracy Is Stifled"]

[Excerpts]

What will become of us?

I fear that a possible blackout may not be the only danger lying in wait for us or the only danger we expect in the coming few months. What I fear will be more serious and more horrible is the possibility that the energy which makes our democracy work and illuminates the light of freedom will fail.

Newspapers published by political parties have come out with headlines affirming and proclaiming that our present experience represents the worst in tyranny, corruption and torture. What will be the next step for us after that?

Why would a ruler cling to democracy if we have in fact reached that point and if what we see, what we write in our newspapers, and what we say in our meetings represent in fact the worst in tyranny, torture and oppression? Why would he defend democracy if, whether or not we have one, we end up with a system that is characterized by tyranny, torture and one-man rule?

The people have been called upon to leave their places of work and production in factories, on farms, in laboratories, and in offices. They've been asked to declare civil disobedience which the Wafd Party's philosophers describe as a "white," clean, and "pure" action because it does nothing more than delay production and interrupt operations. They say this civil disobedience would not hurt Egypt and would not involve workers going out in demonstrations. And what, one wonders, will be the next step in political party dialogue?

It were as though in this country, which imports 60 percent of its needs to make up for its production shortages, demonstrations, not interruptions in operations and production, were the thing to be feared.

And what will come next? The armed forces' loyalty has been called into question, and it was affirmed that their leaders signed a secret agreement with America in which, it's been said, Egypt pledges that its airports and seaports would be available for America's use upon demand. Egypt also pledged that its armed forces' would participate in warding off threats and dangers to which NATO

countries are exposed. It is well-known that the Soviet Union is the one major danger to NATO countries. This means that Egypt would join the countries of Europe to fight Russia. It's been said that Russia knows about this agreement and is staying silent.

Have attempts to cast doubts and suspicions, distort facts, and mislead people gone that far?

The United States and Egypt announce that they signed a Memorandum of Understanding which sets up a framework within which the two countries can work together on scientific, military research and in the weapons industry. The memorandum also allows Egypt to bid for military contracts in the United States. Although the two countries announced the text of the memorandum, knowledgeable parties, who know about everything that goes on behind the scenes and behind closed doors, affirm that the memorandum contains secret articles.

Egypt prints the text of the memorandum, and the minister of defense declares that he signed it after experts in Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Affairs had reviewed it in front of a special committee formed by the head of state. The memorandum was not a surprise. It was not the product of one individual's effort, and it had not been tucked away in one or two desks. Copies of it had been kept in the desks of several individuals. The minister of defense affirms that the memorandum contains no secret articles. And yet, the opposition parties' experts, who must know more than any minister, even the one who signed the memorandum, affirm that the memorandum does contain secret articles.

Secret articles with whom? With the United States? The United States is a country which conducts business openly. In the United States such documents are not classified: only five minutes after this document was signed by Egypt's and the United States' ministers of defense, the text of the memorandum was made available to all journalists and correspondents in Washington.

It was stated quite clearly that neither party assumed any obligation by signing the memorandum, which rather reflects the spirit of cooperation and the relations which both parties intend to have with each other. Had this memorandum involved any commitments, it would have been tantamount to a formal agreement, and it would have had to be presented not only to the People's Assembly in Egypt, but also to the authorized committees of the U.S. Congress. Otherwise, a major scandal would have ensued, and everyone in the United States would be talking about it.

Another memorandum of understanding was signed last April 21 by President Reagan himself and Shamir, the prime minister of Israel. No one heard anything about a discussion of that memorandum in Israel's Knesset, and there were no reports that any congressional committees had requested a review of it. And yet, the cooperation between the United States and Israel which is set forth in

that memorandum, goes far beyond that which is set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding between Egypt and the United States. But it seems that Egypt's opposition parties enjoy stirring up trouble or inflicting severe emotional anguish.

This dispute over the Egyptian-American Memorandum of Understanding does in fact have an extremely serious aspect which manifested itself in the attempts that were made to arouse suspicions about the document. In a real sense the question which has been raised has only one implication: one of the two parties is lying to citizens. Either the minister of defense is lying when he makes statements, and that is a serious charge which, if true, must be looked into; or opposition party newspapers are lying to the people. In that case one has to wonder about their responsibility and accountability.

And what will Egypt's opposition parties do next? They've looked at every accomplishment with jaundiced eyes and deemed everything to be useless and futile.

Opposition party newspapers are asking this question: why are efforts being made to implement the subway without delay, and why is it not being postponed for implementation at a later stage?

Opposition party newspapers are asking why is there so much clamor about water, sewage and telephone projects, even though these are the projects without which neither the private or public sectors nor investment companies can accomplish anything. "Why are these projects being implemented on such a large scale?" these newspapers ask. "Is it necessary to make these services available to all citizens? Why not implement these projects in a few areas only and let the remaining areas drown in their sewage and fend for themselves in dealing with the water shortage and telephones that do not work? And how useful are these large hospitals which are inaugurated in large celebrations?"

That is how much contempt has been heaped on every accomplishment! According to the opposition, these expressions and "great ideas" were coined and set forth to save Egypt. I did not make them up to make fun of the opposition parties. These expressions and ideas are in fact the brainchildren of the Labor Party's brilliant planners. The editor in chief of the party's newspaper spoke on their behalf when he declared in a recent issue of the newspaper, "If the principle of priorities had been used to arbitrate differences, we would have discovered that some of the projects which were implemented could have been postponed and implemented in a future stage. The subway, for example, and several industrial projects could have been postponed. Some projects, such as the telephones project and the water and sewage systems projects, could have been executed on a smaller scale. And some projects, many of these very large hospitals, for example, were basically meaningless." That was a direct quote.

That was the end of the statement I quoted from an article by the editor in chief of the Labor Party's newspaper. It represents the gist of the economic ideas set forth by the brilliant people in the party he represents. Did I then make up expressions that mocked the party's ideas, or are the party's philosophers, writers, and thinkers mocking themselves?

And what more will be said after dialogue in the party's newspapers reaches that point? What more will be said after every minister or official in a position of responsibility is viewed by these parties as a traitor, an ignoramus, or a corrupt individual? What will become of us when Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din Pasha, veteran fighters Ibrahim Shukri and Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, and all those who follow their lead are deemed to be Egypt's only honorable patriots and sincere thinkers?

Democracy is not a goal that one seeks for its own sake. It is rather a way of governing that many rulers shie away from because of its consequences and costs. A few, however, are willing to accept the responsibilities, costs, and, in some cases, the excesses of democracy in their quest for the nobler goal of achieving stability for the country. Those rulers want to furnish for their countries a climate in which all persons can feel safe and secure. They want to furnish a climate in which any native or foreign investor would be willing to contribute efforts or funds to invest in the country. What good is democracy anyway if it were to turn into a reason for destabilizing the country, driving investors away, and stirring up feelings of anxiety and fear in the heart of any citizen?

No one wants or wishes the opposition to be silenced. No one wants more restrictions placed on criticism, and no one wants other opinions to be stifled. At the same time we do not want the opposition to fancy itself as an entity that is separate from society. We do not want it to rejoice over society's problems; we do not want it to cheer for society's crises; and we do not want it to become delighted when society becomes the target of terrorists. We want an opposition that lives and breathes with this society; we want an opposition that knows it is a part of it. We want an opposition that knows it is threatened by what threatens society, an opposition that feels responsible for finding solutions to the crises which society experiences. We want an opposition that joins us in putting out the fires, not one whose hateful lust for power causes it to add fuel to the fire.

One of the dangers which has been added to those dangers which Egypt is facing is the possibility of being deprived of electricity. But if the water level of the Nile River continues to fall and the High Dam's turbines stop turning, having no lights in our homes will not be the only threat to us. The continuing decline in the standard of dialogue, in the level of ideas and in the standards of the parties' methods constitute a graver and a more serious threat to our future, our lives, our efforts, our

work and our ideas. The greatest danger we face is that of overloading the system and allowing the inevitable to happen: democracy could break down, and darkness could prevail.

Our focus shifts from democracy to the electricity which lights our homes. We talk about moral danger, and then we talk about material danger. Does such a danger really exist? What is its magnitude? And what will happen if power production from the High Dam were to stop? I asked Engineer Mahir Abazah, the minister of electricity, "What do you think about this danger? What did you do about it as a responsible minister? What should citizens do about it?" We had a long conversation, but the following points may be the ones that citizens would find interesting.

First, Where Does Electricity Come From?

In Egypt, the two main sources for generating power are hydraulic and thermal.

We have three hydroelectric power plants. The High Dam is the most important and the largest of them. When the water level is 165 meters or higher, it produces 1,750 megawatts of electricity. Besides the High Dam there are two power stations at the Aswan Dam; together, they produce 250 megawatts of electricity.

Other than the hydroelectric power plants, there are thermal power plants which are fueled by oil (mazout or natural gas). But it is better for Egypt to use natural gas at these power plants because, unlike natural gas, liquid gas can be exported. That is why our plan with the Ministry of Oil is to encourage these power plants to replace mazout with natural gas. All our new power plants will be built on the basis of using natural gas.

Thirty percent of all the power produced in Egypt is produced by the High Dam Station; 42 percent is produced by thermal power plants which are fueled by mazout; and 28 percent is produced by power plants which are fueled by natural gas.

Second, What Is the Volume of Production?

The aim of power production anywhere in the world is to furnish the power which is consumed by citizens during peak hours. In Egypt, those peak hours run from 7 p.m. to 10 p.m. During those 3 hours Egypt's governorates, cities and villages consume 6,000 megawatts of electricity. (Note: 1 megawatt equals 1,000 kilowatts.)

This means that the highest consumption of electricity in Egypt occurs during the hours in which the lights are turned on in people's homes. Volume of consumption does not depend on the power consumed by factories. That is what distinguishes Egypt from some advanced countries where the peak hours occur during the morning hours, while the plants are operating. The peak hours there last until noon.

To anticipate any unexpected occurrences, proper planning in any country calls for volume of power production to exceed volume of consumption during peak hours by 15 percent, and that would guard against any malfunction at any power station.

This means that during peak hours our power stations would be ready to produce 7,000 megawatts or 7 million kilowatts of electricity at a moment's notice.

Third, What Effect Has the Dam Had on Our Production?

The turbines at the High Dam Power Station are designed to produce maximum power when the water level of the River Nile behind the dam is 165 meters or higher.

The theory of power production from the dam is based on the principle that water from the river would fall from that high altitude onto the vanes of the turbines which are located 57 meters away. This causes the rotary units to turn, and electricity is thus generated.

But if the water level falls below 165 meters, power production from the High Dam Power Station declines as follows:

—When the water level is 165 meters or higher, the power plant produces 1,759 megawatts of electricity. This is the maximum electrical power which can be generated from the dam.

—At 159 meters production falls to 1,500 megawatts.

—At 154 meters production falls to 1,100 megawatts.

—At 150 meters volume of production is 850 megawatts or approximately half of total production volume.

But if the water level in the Nile River continues to fall and reaches 147 meters, the power plant must be completely shut down, and power generating activities halted. Otherwise, the turbines would be ruined, and repairing them would require billions of pounds. Power production from the dam then depends on the water level.

Fourth, How Imminent Is the Danger?

Five years ago the water level of the Nile had never reached 165 meters in July. It was always lower than that.

At the present time the power stations at the dam are being operated while the water level is 154 meters. That water level makes the production of almost 1,100 megawatts of power possible. This means there is a 10 percent drop in production.

Engineer Mahir Abazah says that Engineer 'Isam Radi, the minister of public works, expects the water level of the Nile to fall to 150 meters in July. But he hopes that the water level will not fall any further.

Next July, therefore, we will be facing one of two possibilities:

—The water level of the Nile could fall to 150 meters and fall no further. Consequently, volume of production at the High Dam Power Plant would not exceed 850 megawatts.

—The second possibility, which is a grave one, is that the water level could continue to fall to 147 meters, and the High Dam Power Plant would be brought to a complete standstill.

No one can confirm which one of the two possibilities we will face. The rainfall which fell in April in the Upper Nile region has been described by water and irrigation experts as a pseudo-flood because it does not indicate that a flood is imminent. We cannot begin to know anything about the coming flood except by studying the rainfall which starts in June and continues through the end of July.

Fifth, Is the Effect of the Shortage Limited to Certain Areas?

Some people think that power which is generated from the dam, for example, is consumed in Upper Egypt. They think that power plants in Cairo and Alexandria provide power to the surrounding areas. Consequently, in the worst case the effect of [shutting down] the High Dam Power Plant will be limited to some areas, and other areas will not be affected. That, however, is not true.

Electricity from the dam is transmitted to Cairo via high pressure lines which are 1,000 kilometers long. These lines can carry half a million volts of power. Inside Cairo and other cities this electricity is distributed through main lines which can carry 220,000 volts of power. The electricity is then distributed to subordinate lines which can carry 11,000 volts of power. From there the electricity is distributed to homes and various other sites at 220 volts of power.

This means that electricity from the High Dam can reach almost every spot in Egypt. It means that the decline in the amount of electricity produced by the High Dam will affect every location in the country.

Note: Electricity travels at 300,000 kilometers per second. Let me repeat, per second. This is the speed of light. It means that electricity from the dam travels from Aswan to the farthest place in Egypt in less than 1/200 of a second.

Sixth, What Is the Magnitude of the Danger?

So far, the magnitude of the danger is limited to the possibility that power production from the dam will not exceed 850 megawatts if the water level of the Nile becomes stable in July and does not fall below 150 meters.

In this case, which is the better possibility, we will be deprived of half of the dam's production. That means Egypt will be deprived of any reserve power should any unexpected malfunction occur at any power station. Such malfunctions happen frequently and, when they do, power service to those areas which receive power from the power plant which malfunctioned will have to be interrupted until the malfunction is repaired.

Stopping operations at the High Dam Power Plant is the worse danger. Power production would fall, and average production would be less than average consumption. And that is something we cannot deal with unless the lights in some areas are turned off alternately during the peak hours of consumption from 7 p.m. to 10 p.m.

Seventh, But What If the Danger Were To Persist?

Engineer Mahir Abazah says, "As far as electricity is concerned, the dangerous period in the worst possible case will not be more than nine months. To guard against any unexpected occurrences, we contacted the United States, France, and Germany this year, and we have agreements with these countries to build in Egypt three power plants which can be quickly installed. In other words, equipment for these power plants would arrive ready for installation. Usually, construction of an ordinary power plant requires 5 years, but for these power plants, construction will not take more than 14 months. At the present time the Americans are building a power plant in Damietta, and the Germans are building one in al-Nubariyah. An agreement will be reached with the French this week to build a third power plant in south Cairo.

Costs for these power plants amount to approximately 500 million dollars. They will produce an additional 1,600 megawatts of electricity. This means that in less than 1 year we will have built the equivalent of a new high dam for generating electricity. Accordingly, we will have a power surplus with which we can face any danger."

Engineer Mahir Abazah refers to another project: an agreement to link Egypt's electricity system with the electricity systems in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Such ideas can be found in Europe, and it is through such linkage that countries in Europe import and export electricity. Each European country uses these interconnected systems to import and export electricity according to its needs. Thus, if Britain, for example, were to have a power shortage for any reason, France would provide it immediately with the power it would need to

meet that shortage. The opposite is also true. Then, at the end of a period of time, which would be agreed upon, each country would calculate how much power it imported or exported.

As far as electricity is concerned, Egypt is still isolated like an island. Recently, however, an agreement was reached with Jordan to link Egypt's electricity system with Jordan's at al-'Aqabah. Linking Egypt's system with Saudi Arabia's will be considered during the visit of Saudi Arabia's minister of electricity to Egypt on May 21. On the other hand, Jordan did reach an agreement with Turkey to link the two countries' systems together, and Egypt has also agreed with Turkey on pursuing linkage between the three countries. Thus, before too long, all the electrical power systems in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Turkey will be linked to each other by networks that will share power and provide each other with electricity in case of any emergency or shortage.

Eighth, Given the Danger, What Should Citizens Be Doing?

Citizens must be willing to face danger. They must help the state by reducing their consumption of electricity during the peak hours. It has been noticed that approximately 8 million television sets are turned on during the peak hours. Of course, all the lights are turned on, and most electric washing machines, air conditioning units, and water heaters are also turned on during those hours. Reduction of consumption and the distribution of consumption are required. The systems must not be so heavily overloaded during those hours.

Engineer Mahir Abazah then tells me with a great deal of enthusiasm, "I am confident that our people can help during these few months, from July to next March. I am confident," says the minister of electricity, "that the people are aware and capable of understanding the situation. We pray we will not reach the point at which we would have to stop operations at the High Dam Power Plant and be forced to cut power alternately to some areas."

I tell myself, "We can handle the threat of a power shortage, but can we handle the threat to democracy?"

I hope and pray that the democracy which political parties considered in planning their activities will ensure the survival of democracy.

We want democracy to be a beacon that will shine forever. We want it to shine and not be exposed for a moment to any possibility of danger which could extinguish the light of democracy. The ruler is most certainly responsible for democracy, but who said he is the only one responsible for it?

Officials Discuss Effects of Water Shortage, Plans
45040124 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 4, 5 May 88

[Article by Jamal al-Shirgawi: "What Do We Do If The Nile Waters Are Also Deficient Next Year?"]

[4 May 88 p 3]

[Excerpts] I began my interview with Engineer 'Isam Radi by asking him to outline our "water status."

The minister said: "Our water status this season, namely the current water year ending at the end of July, is well known and clear. We have already announced it and our measures have been meticulously carried out. They are consistent with our predictions to this point and up to the end of the season.

"As for our water status next year, which begins 1 August, no one can project it because only God knows."

[Question] But there must be some projections.

[Answer] Certainly. Either the river water going to the High Dam lake will be equal to Egypt's share of the Nile waters (55.5 billion meters), will be less than this share or will be more. A supply equal to our share would put us in a pretty good position and we would have nothing to worry about. Nonetheless, we will continue to follow the recently adopted measures, this year in particular, because we will continue to take water rationalization seriously as a fundamental and permanent part of our water policy. Our goal, a supply greater than our share would be a blessing.

(The minister went on to say:) However, if the supply is less than our share for this year, we will have to take other necessary measures.

[Question] Based on indicators you have, can you tell which projection is most likely?

[Answer] No, this not possible at this time. It can only be done in mid-October when the flood water supply is completed and the flood graphic line begins to drop. Only then will I be able to know what I have to work with and whether I can draw on next year's supply.

[Question] And then, in mid-October, you will announce to the people that they are facing a water shortage?

[Answer] Precisely.

[Question] Don't you think that if the supply is smaller, this would be too late and you might suddenly place the people in a critical situation—which is sure to happen—and you would not have enough time to do what has to be done.

[Answer] I cannot announce to the people a position built on projections. I have to rely on sure facts.

[Question] We are talking now after 7 or 9 consecutive years of smaller floods and sweeping drought in the African continent, therefore, it is natural to expect the worst. Why don't you assume the same thing and tell people what to expect, putting forth your measures early enough so that, if things turn out better than expected, we would lose nothing and may even derive benefit from a critical period that may help us in the future.

[Answer] Rest assured that we are keeping our eyes on the river water levels from its source all the way to Aswan. We are watching, observing and calculating. However, I cannot announce something before it happens. Of course, if there are early signs that warrant an announcement before mid-October, we will not hesitate. The important thing is that it be done at the proper time without overplaying or downplaying the situation.

[Question] About the horizontal expansion program, we actually reclaim 150,000 feddans of desert land annually, and that requires large amounts of water, amid the possibility of a smaller supply of river water?

[Answer] The horizontal expansion program is proceeding as planned and we are committed to supplying it with the water allocated to it.

[Question] Is it not better, under the circumstances and until the situation becomes clear, to slow down reclamation? Some believe that this program should be stopped altogether while others are of the opinion that it should be temporarily curtailed. In short, is it not risky to proceed with it?

[Answer] (emphatically): Not at all. How much water do you imagine the 5-year program will need to reclaim 750,000 feddans? It will need 4.5 billion cubic meters. Right now, I have 2.8 billion saved behind the dam: 2.1 billion through lower central flow and 0.7 billion through a smaller rice harvest.

[Question] (taking exception): But your excellency, if the supply is less than our next year's share, the shortage will use up the amount you have saved and we may need more than that to meet the needs of ongoing irrigation in the old land.

[Answer] The reclamation program is a national plan of great significance to the country's economy and we are committed to it. As for water, besides the amounts already saved, we still have many avenues open to us for saving. We have al-'Umum drainage canal which, when completed in 1989, will provide another billion cubic meters, added to 1 billion from the al-Suru and Hadus drainage canal that feeds into al-Salam irrigation canal. Hence, there is no fear that water will be cut off from the new expansion land.

With regard to electric power, a water level below 165 would affect turbine efficiency, but this is very unlikely even though it did happen 4 years ago. We are all aware

of these things in terms of irrigation and electric power. This has nothing to do with optimism or pessimism and there is no contradiction between what I saw and what the minister of electricity says. The High Dam was built with the idea that the water supply not go beyond 160 billion cubic meters so that the dam itself would not be affected and no less than 31 billion cubic meters so that electricity would not be cut off completely.

[Question] And now, what is our water status in figures?

[Answer] Our supply in the dam lake (as of 4 April) was 55 billion cubic meters, 31 billion of which is a reserve which we do not use so that electricity would not be cut off and 24 billion in usable live stock which, of course, has a negative effect on electric power generation which becomes less efficient as water is drawn, between 20 May and the end of July in particular, or until August 1 when water levels go up with the new flood.

[Answer] (The minister enumerated the measures adopted so far:)

—Expanded use of recycled sewage water in irrigation, using 3.5 billion cubic meters this year and this figure will be increased to 7 billion by the end of the plan.

—Expanded use of ground water in the Nile Valley and the Delta. Drilling work on 140 new producing wells in Minya and al-Minufiyah is near completion. This is in addition to putting wells in al-Sharqiyah, al-Qalyubiyah and al-Minufiyah into operation, providing 200 million cubic meters annually, and 136 completed wells in Samalut and Gharb alFushan to provide 400 million cubic meters annually. By and large, we will raise the amount of water we obtain from the ground from the current 2.3 billion to 4 billion cubic meters by the end of the plan.

—Lowering the outflow during the minimum use period, thereby gaining 1.1 billion cubic meters that used to flow into the sea.

—Prolonging the winter damming period from 21 to 28 days, thereby gaining close to 140 million cubic meters.

This is in addition to projects the ministry is undertaking to develop irrigation systems, to store water in lakes and to develop the Nile watercourses and installations thereon.

[Question] This is what the ministry is doing. Would you like the people to make provisions for an unknown water year to protect themselves, their crops and Egypt's future?

[Answer] Of course I would. I hope that in these critical times every drop of water will be conserved through the following:

Strict observation of irrigation rotation schedules, turning to night irrigation and ensuring that water at the end of the irrigation canals is not wasted.

Abstention from violations and encroachment on irrigation and drainage canals.

Maintenance of private irrigation canals, keeping them free of weeds, keeping the ground level and cutting down on water consumption in general.

[5 May 88 p 3]

[Excerpts] We use 3.7 billion cubic meters of water for drinking, household use and various commercial uses. Another 3 billion cubic meters are used in industry, bringing the total to 6.7 billion cubic meters annually.

In greater Cairo alone, (Cairo and the two governorate capitals of Giza and al-Qalyubiyah) we consume 300 to 350 million cubic meters of this amount, depending on how hot the weather is.

So what will Cairo do in the face of such extravagance if water becomes short?

I addressed this question to Engineer Sa'd-al-Din al-Dib, deputy director of the Greater Cairo Water Utility (the director was out of the country), who said: "The first thing we ought to do, naturally, is to cut down on waste."

The man in charge of Cairo water mentioned the following "painful" facts:

—20 to 25 percent of our share is wasted in the water pipeline network.

—Another 20 to 25 percent is wasted inside the homes.

—Total waste amounts to no less than 45 percent!

This waste is caused by a rundown water system, broken pipes and free public faucets, etc.

[Question] Even in just cutting waste, what have you done and what do you intend to do?

[Answer] Our responsibility is to repair the network. Therefore, we are intensifying our maintenance operations. We have embarked upon a program, with the help of a German grant, to reduce waste to 8 to 10 percent, thereby bringing it down to the world level. We are working in certain areas (because the process is very costly): the west bank of the Nile.

[Question] How much will this program save?

[Answer] We can save up to 150,000 cubic meters a day which is equal to a water station big enough to supply 150,000 households or 5-member families.

[Question] How long will this process take?

[Answer] Between 8 and 10 years. We have started another program for al-Zamalik Island to be completed within a year. We don't know how much this program will yield.

[Question] What are we going to do now to face another very serious problem, namely the water shortage?

[Answer] First of all, we are making greater use of ground water wells. In Greater Cairo, 10 to 15 percent of the water comes from wells, a rate we aim to raise to 20 to 25 percent. We have built a water treatment station in al-Marj to remove iron and magnesium from the water to make it drinkable.

We are trying to make drinking water available for drinking only. In Heliopolis, Nasir City and Ma'adi, impure water networks that draw water from the Isma'iliyah Canal have been built for watering gardens, thereby saving 90,000 cubic meters of pure filtered drinking water a day which used to be used for this purpose.

Work is under way to install water meters in homes to control consumption.

We are urging the Ministry of Industry to recycle water used by industry instead of throwing it into the Nile, thus polluting the river. Water treatment and recycling means that factories would be allotted a fixed amount for use throughout the year. This would save large amounts of drinking water. We hope that this year will be a turning point in this regard.

[Question] How much can we save by all these measures?

[Answer] Not less than two-thirds of the current greater Cairo share, or between 1 and 1.18 billion cubic meters annually.

[Question] Will you turn to other means to conserve fresh water for emergencies?

[Answer] Yes. We are preparing mobile water tanks and have a proposal under study to bottle fresh water in 1-liter plastic bags as a contingency plan.

I went to the National Water and Sewage Authority which is in charge of the rest of the regions. I met with Engineer 'Abd-al-Salam al-Rafi', the deputy director (the director was out of the country), who reviewed with me the water situation, saying that the authority supplies 50 percent of the people's needs at the present time and the rest is met through personal efforts. He emphasized that the network now covers most Egyptian cities and villages, but its shortcomings, due to some defects, stand in the way of water getting to some areas, the remote ones in particular.

He also said that 30 percent of water supplied by the authority for drinking or industry is wasted due to three reasons: water seepage due to broken pipes and maintenance problems, free public faucets in rural areas and public misuse through failure to attend to malfunctions in household fixtures, water tanks in particular.

[Question] What precautions have you taken to face a probable water shortage?

[Answer] We are now studying the possibility of expanded use of ground water. We have constructed local water treatment stations for removing iron and magnesium. One such station will be tested in Giza in preparation for making them available to the remaining areas. This project is being carried out in cooperation with Czechoslovakia. One station can treat 2,000 cubic meters a day and costs 200,000 Egyptian pounds to set up. As for operation costs, they are negligible.

[Question] Do you plan to turn to wells throughout the country?

[Answer] Throughout the republic. South of the Mit Ghamr-Tanta water pipeline, ground water is fit for drinking after treatment, but north of the Delta, it has a high salt content and, therefore, unfit for drinking.

[Question] Yes, we have conducted a new study to desalinate sea water. We found out that one cubic meter of water (using the ion-exchange theory and certain chemicals), needs 20 kilowatt hours and costs 2.00 Egyptian pounds. In another desalinization study (using the evaporation system), one cubic meter costs 1.00 pound. We are now designing water desalinization units for anyone who wants them. A unit with a production capacity of 100 cubic meters a day costs half a million pounds and with a 500 cubic meter capacity costs 2 million pounds. The former is enough for a community of 1,000 residents and the latter for one of 5,000 residents.

[Question] Will you be able to save money for the worst possibility?

[Answer] We have to. We have no other choice.

[Question] Can you store what you save?

[Answer] To some extent. Right now, we have reservoirs equal to 20 percent of daily consumption which we used to balance the lower night consumption with the higher day consumption and peak hours. I cannot, however, expand the storage capacity because one cubic meter costs 100 to 200 pounds to store!

[Question] After all these measures, what will you do if faced with an actual water shortage?

[Answer] There are two things I can do: either raise the price of water to limit consumption....

[Question] (interrupting) Higher than the current rate?

[Answer] The rate is very low. One cubic meter costs 25 to 30 piasters. We used to sell it to the consumer for 3 piasters, a rate the policies committee recently raised to 5 piasters for the first 30 cubic meters of a month's consumption with a progressive increase for each increment. The selling price is still lower than the cost price.

12502

Financial Sources Give Reasons for Black-Market's Strength

45040143a Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic
21 May 88 pp 33, 34

[Text] Discrepancy between the Egyptian pound rate of exchange in the black market (240 piasters) and the posted rate in the free banking market (226 piasters) is continuing despite the recent regulatory decisions which heralded doing away once and for all with the black market. The reasons, according to several banking sources is, first, the inappropriate timing in the light of the economic conditions suffering from acute foreign currency shortage and the inability of the free market to meet those needs. The second reason, according to the same sources, is that organizing the free market did not resolve the question of providing foreign currencies for pilgrimage and for foreign travel whether for pleasure or medical treatment and leaving these outlets undefined. These sources are unanimous in saying that the black market will continue to flourish as long as the drug trade continues. It is estimated in this regard that the Egyptians pay a total of about \$1 billion for drugs. The same sources also make several remarks about the monetary situation in Egypt; they particularly point to the low rate of interest (11.5 percent), compared with an annual inflation rate (20 percent). The private sector foreign currency deposits in Egyptian banks at the end of 1985 totaled about \$7.3 billion.

13305

LEBANON

Government Links Wage Adjustment To Improving Rate of Exchange

44000105 Limassol MEMO in English
May 88 pp 21-22

[Article by Dr Nadim Sa'd: "Crucial Month for the Social and Economic Life of Lebanon"]

[Text] At the start of the month on the 5th the General Federation of Labour called for a strike which was intended to give a warning to the government that it would adjust wages for the inflation that took place in the last six months of 1987. The Federation has called as well for two days of strike on the 14th and 15th of April and University professors of the national Lebanese University are already on strike for their own wage claims.

By the second week of April the majority of bank employees went on an open strike for adjustment of their wages as well. In the face of these developments the government finds itself in a very delicate position. It is trying to gain time before taking a final decision as to the adjustment that should be made for reasons that will become obvious.

Between July 1987 and the end of October of that year, the Lebanese Pound lost on its exchange value a great deal. From 200 LP to the dollar the exchange rate fell at the end of October to 670 LP to the dollar and the reserves of the General Bank were reduced to the lowest level yet witnessed in the past four years which was 100 and 5 million dollars. At that time, the GFL called for an open general strike on the 5th of November asking for compensation for previous inflationary trends and that strike lasted for three days and did not win popular support. The Lebanese were anxious to make a living and were suffering from an inability to earn enough to cover their expenses. The real level of living had fallen to half its level of the years that immediately preceded the war which started in 1975.

At present the GFL are asking for increases in wages in the order of 310 percent which represents the increases in the cost of living since the end of June 1987 and until the end of December of last year. By contrast, there is limited objection to the figure as a measure of the inflation that took place. However, there had been new factors on the scene represented by a significant improvement in the exchange rate of the Lebanese Pound on the one hand, and a slowing down followed by a reversal of inflation.

Reasons for Improvement of Exchange Rate

Today, the Lebanese Pound is exchanging for the dollar at 363 Pounds to the Dollar which represents a significant improvement from the level at the end of October. Moreover, the rate of inflation has slowed down to less than 10 percent in January and fell by 7.6 percent in February and 18 percent in March. It is the conviction of the Lebanese Government, particularly the acting Prime Minister who is as well the Minister of Social Affairs, that April will witness another decline in the cost-of-living that could match if not exceed that of March. If this were the case, the acting Prime Minister Dr Salim al-Huss argues it is far better to limit wage increases to below 100 percent in order not to jeopardize the rate of exchange which has tended to stabilize. The rate of exchange of the Lebanese Pound is extremely important to the cost of living because Lebanon imports at least 60 percent of all the items that are consumed in the country. Still inflation had touched not only imported items but as well locally produced goods particularly those that have a high import content. Even agricultural products have increased in prices at a very fast rate although the import content in the final value of these products is very limited. This has been the case because Lebanese agricultural products became very inexpensive for imports.

from Lebanon who started to increase their demand for these products. Understandably local producers in comparing between export prices and internal prices tried to get for their products what they could from selling these products to importers from Lebanon.

The Government's tendency to delay the adjustment of wages has been linked very strongly to the improving rate of exchange and the impact that this has brought to the cost of living. Dr al-Huss believes strongly that it is better for Lebanon and for prospects of growth in the near future, particularly after the election of a new President as of this July, to have the exchange rate much nearer to where it stands those days rather than where it stood six months before. He is convinced that this will be better for growth, for the standard of living and for social justice in the country.

By contrast, the GFL claim and demonstrate that wages are insufficient to cover the requirements of families of the working class. There are many indications which show that the case is true. Consequently, the decision on this question of wages has become extremely complicated. There is the need to enable people to sustain their standard of living or at least a gradually falling standard of living. Yet, this objective if it were to be worked for by a heavy increase in wages could bring about the exact reverse. Lebanese organizations cannot afford this increase in wages without much higher increases of prices of final products which would mean that inflation would yet again eat up any advantages that are desired by Labour. Moreover, most Lebanese organizations failing to increase wages by the rates indicated would have to release at least 40 percent of the total labour force which would be catastrophic at present.

In recent months there have been indications that political differences are mellowing. Also there have been definite indications that the Lebanese balance of payments has been in surplus due to a number of reasons which can be summarized as follows.

1—Total imports into Lebanon had declined considerably because there is no prosperity in the country and the people are satisfying their essential needs first and foremost. Whereas in 1982, the Lebanese imported 3 billion dollars worth of products and in spite of the dollar devaluation since then imports in 1987 were nearer to a billion dollars.

2—Most of the deposits with banks in Lebanon have been transformed into deposits in foreign currencies. Their total amounts to 3.2 billion dollars which for a country of 3 million is relatively high and these deposits are earning interest of at least 200 million dollars which represents a positive element on the balance of payments.

3—Lebanese exports of industrial products have increased at a rapid rate because the cost of these products is very low for importers from Lebanon. Total

industrial exports amounted to around 450 million dollars in 1987, which is a figure still below that achieved in 1982 or 1983 but it has reached significant levels. Of this total, possibly 200 million dollars represents the value added in Lebanon.

Finally, and most importantly, the fourth point is that Lebanon which had been subsidizing fuel products changed its policy and eliminated subsidies for gasoline and gasoil and LPG as of the beginning of December. That move, in itself, was the most significant in reducing the waste that had been eating up the foreign resources of Lebanon and increasing the deficit of the Government which reached 120 billion Lebanese Pounds in 1987. The readjustment of fuel prices had retrieved in principle the equivalent of 70 billion pounds of the deficit noted for the Lebanese government. However, there continues to be a deficit on account of fuel oil particularly used for electricity generation and by some capital intensive industries in Lebanon. Fuel oil is still subsidized to the tune of 30 billion Lebanese Pounds.

The Central Bank Role

Due to the above factors, the Lebanese Pound stood in a good position to improve its exchange value. This took its course and it could have improved in exchange value beyond the levels it had achieved had it not been for very heavy purchases of dollars by the Central Bank of Lebanon. By mid April, the Central Bank reserves had increased in the month extending from November 1987 till mid April by 600 million dollars in spite of the opening of letters of credit amounting to 250 million dollars for imports of various necessary products particularly fuel. The Central Bank in buying the dollars from the market which it still continues to exercise up to the time of writing had been pumping Lebanese currency into the market. After this currency reaches the banks and individuals who sell the dollars, the Central Bank was absorbing the liquidity through the issue of government paper. Government bonds for one year are earning in the secondary market an interest rate of 46 percent. This means that if the policy of accumulating dollars by the Central Bank continues for the remaining months until the end of the summer, there could be possibly another 200 billion Lebanese Pounds worth something between 500 and 600 million dollars which would be entering the system and being re-absorbed by the Government against the issue of Government bonds. The question that one has to ask is when will the impact of these purchases show? Such an impact has to show that the interest falls due and although the Government bonds issued have been scattered over a great number of months and will continue to be so, as of the end of the year or even before then, these interest payments will fall due and will definitely force the exchange value of the Lebanese Pound to fall considerably unless in the meantime there is a great surge of the economy and the Central Bank becomes able to lower interest rates to acceptable levels.

At the present time, interest rates on loans are around 50 percent and still it is extremely difficult for businesses and business people to secure loans from the commercial banks. The Central Bank has made sure through a number of regulations that it would be itself the first absorber of the liquidity it is creating itself in its drive to secure dollars that will buttress the foreign exchange reserves of the country.

Against this background, it becomes clear that an increase of 310 percent in salaries and wages would drive up the exchange value of the dollar against the Pound by a significant margin and invite rapid inflation again into the Lebanese economy. That would be catastrophic because such a development would turn the expectations of the Lebanese population away from the Lebanese Pound as happened in 1986 and 87 when the Lebanese rushed to exchange their Pounds for Dollars or French Francs or Deutsche Marks or whatever. The stabilization of the Lebanese Pound has forced most people to exchange a sum of the foreign currencies to pay for their requirements and it has also led some people who wanted to make longer term investments to go into the Lebanese Pound in substantial amounts of money in order to realize the projects they have. Over the past three months even traders who had shifted away from accepting the Lebanese currency for the products they were selling started to price their products and services in Lebanese Pounds and to accept to offer short term credit in the currency for purchasers. In other words the Pound became again a fairly acceptable medium of exchange and began to fulfill the basic function of any currency which it seemed to have lost in 86 and 87.

The dilemma challenging the Lebanese Government is understandable because the consequences of a reversal of the trend towards stabilisation of the Lebanese Pound could be extremely drastic to the future of Lebanon. And yet the demands of the Labour Unions are understandable because of the fact that very few families earn sufficiently to cover their current costs. If anything the situation signifies that once Lebanon achieves a certain measure of normalcy in every day life it would need, if it is to sustain the standard of living of its people although much reduced, substantial foreign aid or else, the standard of living is likely to fall below 30 percent of what it used to be 13 years ago.

With the situation in mind, it is clear that any decision will be very difficult. Moreover, it is clear that the decision can be one of compromise in anticipation of better days after this summer and the election of a new president. It is certainly true that if circumstances improved to the point of encouraging a flow of investments, such a flow could compensate for fears of the loss of foreign exchange and enable the country to grow at a fast rate. Yet the time bomb that has been introduced into the picture is that of the absorption of liquidity created by the Central Bank against purchases of dollars which liquidity is being paid for at very high rate of interest. That rate also raises the rate of interest for

borrowers for common productive uses and cannot continue at the present level if inflation is negative or below 10 percent. This situation in itself has to be reversed to make any increases in wages of around 100 percent sustainable for some time to come. This is the problem that has to be handled and the Government has been showing some wisdom in taking its time to decide on these issues.

Conclusion

The review of issues and facts about wage claims, the cost of living increases, and the fragility of the exchange rate dictates a number of conclusions.

1—High wage increases would weaken the Lebanese Pound, stimulate inflation and contribute to greater uncertainty.

2—Increases up to 100 percent of the wage levels at the end of June 1987 in addition to any increases granted last year could lead to a mild increase in the dollar exchange rate. This is particularly true because the private sector has already granted such increases. Public sector increments would equal LL2 billion/month, or \$6 million at current exchange rates. The Central Bank has been buying \$5 million/day on average in the past 120 days whilst the dollar rate fell.

3—To regain the development thrust Lebanon must receive generous aid once the political picture improves significantly which seems possible in the coming few months.

4—The Central Bank must change its policy of absorbing liquidity in Lebanese pounds through extensive issue of high interest bearing government bonds. This practice is like a time bomb with a short fuse that will burn in 9 months.

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SUDAN

Rebel Leader Interviewed on Politics, Military Operations

45040127B Khartoum AL-RAYAH in Arabic
24, 25 Apr 88

[Interview with Major Yusuf Kuwah, member of the SPLM high command, by Majid Yusuf; Addis Ababa, date not given]

[24 Apr 88 p 3]

[Text] When I traveled to Addis Ababa, one of the priorities of my schedule was to meet John Garang, however, his office replied that Garang was in the Sudan at the time, somewhere in Equatoria, perhaps near the city of Juba. The director of the Addis Ababa office, Deng Ubur, told me this with a smile on his lips. I did

not comment. "But," he added, "we expect him at any time." I told him that my second choice was to meet one of the movement's leaders who was not southern and not Christian, since they always talk about the national and comprehensive character of the movement.

He said to me, "Major Yusuf Kuwah is with us these days. He is a member of the high command of the movement and commander of the Nubah Mountains military district." I accepted without hesitation.

Finally, here is the mysterious figure who has been charged with carrying out the Khartoum coup and disciplining the city's people. I had a long conversation with him in more than two sessions. At one of them, the movement's information officer, Atem Yak, was present. What did Yusuf Kuwah say?

[Question] In my mind and in the minds of the Sudanese people, your name is associated with brutality and inhumanity because of the operations you carried out during your military presence in Umm Durayn and other areas of South Kordofan. Why was this? How were the citizens at fault?

[Answer] First, and without generalities, I want you to clarify the nature of the savage acts you have mentioned, because I am hearing about them for the first time.

[Question] I say that you raped women, killed innocent citizens, and burned their homes and farms. As a result, people fled the area and migrated to other areas.

[Answer] But who carried out these acts?

[Question] Your movement's armed group, which you were leading, did it. Thus, you are personally responsible for the damage done to the citizens.

[Answer] That is not true. Who told you so? What is the proof that your information is correct?

[Question] Quite simply, citizens were living peacefully in the area until you arrived. Afterwards, they fled from their area. The citizens are the ones who said this.

[Answer] I regret to inform you that this information is incorrect, fundamentally so. We live with the citizens. It is not in our interest to treat them as enemies. This does not apply only to the SPLA; all guerrilla wars rely heavily on the citizenry for food, water, and information. They are to us "like water to the fish." We cannot live without them. Such talk is intended to defame us. I utterly deny that the things you have mentioned took place at our hands. We went to bring citizens in order to recruit them. We succeeded in bringing tremendous numbers of them, which confirms the incorrectness of the charge.

[Question] Those who join you—do they come to you voluntarily and of their own free will, or do you go and get them?

[Answer] There are large numbers of citizens who want to join the movement but who cannot reach us because of the security zone that the army maintains. Therefore, we facilitate the task of their reaching us for training.

[Question] Where are they trained?

[Answer] Inside the Sudan.

[Question] Where?

[Answer] These are military secrets.

[Question] Let us go back to our basic question. Who is it who is killing, plundering, and raping?

I do not know. The army itself burned citizens and killed them. Why didn't you write these facts?

[Answer] We write all the facts. In the events of Umm Durayn, in particular, a journalist named Musa 'Ali Sulayman traveled there. You commented over your radio station on part of what he wrote. We have no interest in hiding information.

You, on the contrary, hide information and do not mention the facts. The army is responsible for all the violations, and the militias are its partners. The army carries on war operations and brings in a number of militias to steal, rape, and plunder cattle.

[Question] This is talk that is objectionable and untrue. What is the army's interest in that? The army is the army of the citizen. It defends him from you and your likes. The citizens are the ones complaining. This is their version of events.

[Answer] What kind of citizen? You hide the facts. The government armed certain tribes and left the others unarmed. The government is responsible for the deterioration of security and for the current intertribal conflicts.

[Question] The subject we have to discuss is not who armed the tribes, but why the tribes armed themselves, and who created the abnormal situation that made arms necessary. In my view, you are responsible for that because of the security tensions you created in the region.

[Answer] Let us be realistic and accurate in our evaluation of things. The arming began during the time of Numayri. It began for tribal reasons. Another fact you should be aware of is that in our wars we are fighting the army. We do not target the citizens. This fact will be confirmed to you by a citizen I hope you will make an effort to find. His name is 'Abdallah. He is a merchant from the Baggara tribe, from Suq Saraf al-Jamus. This

citizen confirmed this fact in the report he presented to the security committee in Kaduqli. Look for this citizen; the successful journalist is the one who makes an effort to look for the truth.

I sent this citizen to al-Faki 'Ali al-Humrah because we had information that he had obtained weapons from the government and had begun to form militias. I sent him a letter stating that we were not against the Baggara or against the citizens; we were against the army. Whoever sided with the army became our enemy, regardless of his tribe. I received reports that this citizen had delivered this letter to the Kaduqli security committee. We sent letters to all the leaders of the Baggara. We told them we were not against them. Some of them replied to our letters. We respect them. As I said, our position is that whoever supports us is with us; whoever supports the army is our enemy—or else he should be neutral.

[Question] Isn't it strange for you to ask citizens to be neutral in a war like the one upon which you are embarking?

[Answer] Whoever sides with the army must bear the consequences of his position.

[Question] How do you ask citizens to be neutral and avoid supporting the armed forces that are fighting in their name and dying for their sake?

[Answer] I said that we are fighting the government and fighting the army. We are doing this for the sake of the citizens. We are not against them. Otherwise, our movement would have ended long ago, and we would not have won victories.

[Question] If what you are saying is true, why do citizens flee from you? Why do they leave areas in which your specter appears?

[Answer] No citizen has fled his area because of us. Those who flee are the merchants.

[Question] Why are the merchants fleeing?

[Answer] Ask them.

[Question] That is not an answer.

[Answer] They flee because of their feeling that they are part of the government; and the government, of course, is the object of our military activity.

[Question] Am I to understand from what you say that there are three groups: one on your side, one on the side of the government, and one in the middle?

[Answer] That is correct. Of course, we like the middle group.

[Question] Do you perhaps consider yourselves a government?

[Answer] Of course we are a government in the areas we control.

[Question] I have learned that during the military operations you led in the Nubah Mountains, you fled because of military pressure from the armed forces. You were forced to flee. Why do you flee from the battlefield, if you are a militant working to liberate us, as you say?

[Answer] You say I fled; I call it tactical withdrawal. I say that I went to get citizens opposed to the situation, so as to train them, and so that they might then take part in the war of liberation. As long as we in the mountains are against the existing situation, the people of the region must carry on the liberation operation. I know our region from the point of view of language, customs, traditions, and the manner of dealing with the citizens—which does not prevent the participation of people from other areas.

[Question] In all frankness, are you convinced about what you are now doing? Is this the only way to solve the problems of the Sudan?

[Answer] I say that if anyone rebels or takes up arms, there are causes that led him to do so. The solution of the problem lies in treating those causes, rather than dealing with the results.

Accusations solve no problem. Even the politicians now active in the political arena have previously accused us of lack of patriotism, of being agents, and of lying. But that has solved no problem. Looking at the motives and causes in a spirit of disinterestedness, rather than in a partisan or personal spirit, is the way to solve the Sudan's problem. We are working for the Sudan. You all should know that we in the movement are not secessionists, nor do we demand to be the first and last force. We demand the best solution for the problems of the Sudan. Our demand is not the removal and replacement of the existing authority. Were that the case, we should have accomplished nothing, since after a time another force would inevitably come and take our place. We are therefore striving for shared authority.

We want peace. We want dialogue. At the same time, we reject "a dialogue of cunning," in which one side tries to deceive the other and make it accept its conditions.

Al-Sadiq says he successfully isolated the movement domestically when the political forces signed the charter he prepared (the Transitional Charter of the Sudan). He also says that he has isolated us internationally. We say that is nonsense. Our diplomacy is active, as indicated by what Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi said in Egypt.

No one will be able to isolate us domestically, as long as there exists what they call a fifth column indicating the existence of support for us. If al-Sadiq al-Mahdi is really

a patriot, he should come down a bit from his ivory tower and deal with our statements on the basis of their being true. There is lack of consultation about representation in the government. Are there not backward areas in which the authorities take no interest? Since the Sudan became independent, a class of masters has controlled our affairs. The citizens are divided into three grades: first, second, and third. We believe these things exist. We think the way out is to discuss them fully and clearly.

The Khartoum government mistakenly announces that there are conflicts and splits within the movement. These are delusions. We know they are trying to split the movement, but cannot.

[Question] Am I to understand from this that the government is making attempts to split your movement?

[Answer] Yes, there are plots today, and there will be plots tomorrow, but all of that is destined to fail, because our consciousness is greater than that. If al-Sadiq believes he is talking to blocs with the old mentality, the mentality of those who run behind authority, he is mistaken.

[Question] Honestly, can you guarantee that there are no people who run behind authority within your movement?

[Answer] There may be two or three. As a movement, however, we do not accept that. We teach our fighters that there are no compromises that we accept on the basis of personalities and promotions, because this is not the movement of an individual.

[Question] At least the final part of what you say is not completely true, since I know that John Garang is the military leader and political thinker. Indeed, the best known name of your movement is "Garang's Movement."

[Answer] This is a trivialization of the movement that some people employ. There are other charges against the movement and its leaders—that John Garang, for example, is a dictator. But these are things that do not lessen our importance. We consult with our fighters in all the steps we take. Had the movement been that of one individual, it would have ended; it would not have lasted 5 years.

To the people of Khartoum I say that if they think 5 years are a long time, they are not. There are movements that have lasted more than 20 years and still continue. In my view, what the People's Movement has accomplished in 5 years is greater than its age. Such an achievement is not accomplished by means of a one-man movement or by highwaymen. Had that been the case, such achievements would never have been achieved.

[Question] Despite your claim to be struggling for liberation of the Sudan, your military behavior and positions have in general led to the growth of the idea among northern intellectuals that it is necessary to separate the South. What is your opinion about this? If it were to happen, don't you agree with me that the cause of non-southerners like yourself would have been lost?

[Answer] In the past, it was the movement that was accused of separatism. There is nothing in our charters about separation or a call for it. Instead, we have begun to hear about a call for separation emanating from certain voices in the North. We ask ourselves what is this South that you will separate, and where the separation will take place. At the old geographical boundaries of the South? If that happened, would it be the solution to the problem? What about us in the Nubah Mountains? Would we be separated with the South, or would we be left with the North?

In any case, if the South is separated without the Nubah Mountains, that would confirm one result for us—that taking up arms realizes demands. That is a danger. It is encouragement to all separatist forces to work for the destruction of the country. It opens the door to groups from Darfur who believe that there are problems requiring solution in the Sudan and that one of their options is secession. There are also groups in the east of the Sudan. We would discover that the end result would be the fragmentation and collapse of the Sudan. There is a problem in the Sudan. We have demanded its solution and have struggled to that end. The alternative is that the Sudan remain in its old condition, with authority concentrated in a handful of people, and the rest of the other problems.

[Question] The call for separation did not come as a rejection of solution to the problems. It was a condemnation of the way you follow in giving expression and making demands. Furthermore, who told you that the choice of armed demand was the demand of the masses of the Nubah Mountains? What I know is that they have their own political party represented in the Constituent Assembly. This party expresses their demands within the framework of the democratic system they have approved.

[Answer] The formula of political action for the Nubah Mountains is not a new formula. The Nubah Mountains have been presenting their demands since 1964. What has been the result?

They accused us of racism and put pressures on us. Racism in what? Because we said the mountains were backward and demanded an improvement of conditions.

The political parties used to bring their deputies from Khartoum to stand for election in the Nubah Mountains. These imported deputies did not reflect the problems of the area, problems of basic demands. When the Union of the Nubah Mountains was established, they said we were

agents of Israel and exerted efforts to distort our image. Those people used to deal with the results, without looking at the causes. They did not ask why the Union of the Nubah Mountains was established, or why the Darfur Awakening Front and the Beja Union. Had they dealt with these causes, the present situation would not have happened.

I was a member of the regional parliament. Whenever I spoke about the problems of the region, they accused me of racism. So I arrived at the conviction that it was necessary to take up arms, since political support by itself solves no problem.

[Question] The problem is clear for me, Mr Kuwah. My question is as follows: There are two schools, one represented by Philip Ghabbush on the one hand and by Amin Falin and his group on the other hand. You represent the second school. Do you believe these two schools complement each other and that there is harmony between you?

[Answer] What I say is that there have been attempts at a peaceful solution, but they did not lead to results. I therefore turned to bearing arms, because arms have registered positive results in the South and will lead to even more positive results in the future. Arms are not an end in themselves; they are a means. Politics are also a means to the same goal, though one should bear in mind that the sound of the rifle is louder than the sound of the voice. Their work is also important and is complementary to our work. I hope you do not use this as an excuse to put them in jail. We are all working for the sake of the region; that is their method, and this is mine.

[Question] If, as you say, the Popular Movement is working for the Sudan, why this narrow view?

[Answer] The region is part of the Sudan. My view is that the treatment should be for the entire Sudan. You cannot separate the part from the whole, because the whole is composed of parts.

[25 Apr 88 p 3]

[Text] [Question] Despite what you say about the national character of the movement now, the tribal character—by which I mean specifically Dinka—dominates at the higher levels of the movement's leadership and in its representatives outside the country. I know those who work in the London, Nairobi, and Harare offices, and even here in Addis Ababa. Don't you agree with the view that the role of the presence of someone like you is limited to improving the image of the movement? Where is the real representation of the Sudan?

[Answer] There is real representation of the Sudan at the level of the fighters. They are present on the battlefield. Their not being represented in the high command is due to their late entry into the movement.

From the historical point of view, the racial composition of the movement began with the 104th and 105th Battalions. Eighty percent of the men of these battalions were from the Nuer. When the split eventually took place, the majority in both groups was Nuer. In the leadership, there were Nuer and Dinka. John Garang and William Thon were in the first faction; 'Abdallah Chol (Nuer) and Kwat Im (Dinka) were in the second faction. The latter formed the Anya Nya 2, which later made an agreement with Numayri. These are historical facts.

Afterwards came the Jarad group, most of whom were from the Bor Dinka. Then came the Mur Mur group, most of whom were from the Bahr al-Ghazal Dinka.

If you counted the membership of the movement now, you would find that the majority are in fact from the Dinka tribe. In fact, most of the movement's top-level commanders are from the Dinka tribe. A fact we must not forget is that the Dinka are a large tribe. Afterwards, large numbers came from Equatoria and thousands of others from the Nubah Mountains. When I was chosen for leadership, that did not take place because of the large number of the Nubah, but in order to represent a section of the Sudan.

If we wanted to take a count of the movement now, we would find that the majority are from the Bahr al-Ghazal Dinka, and not from the Bor, as some suggest.

True, most of those who supervise representation abroad are from the Dinka, but that does not mean preference or favoritism. In the administration of the camps, we take into account representation of all areas and tribes. In our diplomatic delegations, we take into account representation of all regions.

[Question] In my question, I meant representation in the movement's high command.

[Answer] Half of the movement's high command is not Dinka—6 out of 12 members. A fact we must not forget is that five members of the high command founded this movement.

[Question] Where are you in relation to the internal conflicts? With which of the wings do you side?

[Answer] About what conflicts are you talking?

[Question] The conflicts that led to the arrest of Carbino, and of L. Ukul after him.

* [Answer] Yes, Carbino has now been arrested; but who said anything about the arrest of L. Ukul? These are claims and lies that have been published in the Khartoum newspapers and that have made us laugh a great deal. This movement is not the way some people picture it—a bunch of gangs eating each other up. When I arrived in Addis Ababa for the first time, some people

portrayed this movement for me as if it were going to fall tomorrow. These are the notions of those who stand against the movement. If the situation in the movement were to reach the degree of conflict you speak of, I would leave it.

[Question] Why did you arrest Carbino?

[Answer] Carbino had ambitions of heading the movement. In order to realize his ambition, he began to exploit the tribal rift. We reject this.

[Question] Isn't this ingratitude on your part? How do you arrest the commander of the battalion that began the rebellion, or the real commander of the movement?

[Answer] What does his being the real commander of the movement mean? This is not a sufficient reason for him to assume the presidency of the movement, especially when he wants to do so on a tribal basis. Why are we bearing arms now and fighting? I ask you to banish from your mind the notion that the movement is tribal, because that is government propaganda.

This Carbino is a strange man. There is a system in the movement, and he is the second man. Why does he want to be the first man? We know that the government of the Sudan attempts to exploit men of this kind and use them to split the movement.

[Question] Do you think the government lay behind what Carbino did?

[Answer] Yes, and we have proof of it.

[Question] Then the movement has been penetrated?

[Answer] Why not? They may find a weak individual with whom one can strike a bargain. They tried it with me personally. They sent Ahmad Misu to me. He tried to win me over, but I refused.

[Question] Why did you refuse? Was the offer not attractive, or was it because you were headstrong?

[Answer] It was not a matter of being headstrong. I believe in what I am doing and in the goals of the movement. There is nothing that will make me change my opinion.

[Question] Does that mean that were it not for John Garang, there would be no Major Yusuf Kuwah?

[Answer] By God, if we had been within the borders, I would have formed a movement by myself. Unfortunately, the Nubah Mountains are located in the center of the Sudan.

[Question] What would you do if John Garang for some reason or another reached an agreement with the government?

[Answer] I would remain here and form "People's Movement 2." I am certain that if the government responds to John Garang or detaches the South, that will provoke the other regions—Darfur, the (Anqasna), and the Beja—and they will rebel against the government. When they come here, they will find Yusuf Kuwah waiting for them. We have already learned the way. By now they should know how a person gets out and meets us. They will come in. We know the way to get weapons and form our movement.

[Question] What were the reasons for your joining the movement? Is there a story to it?

[Answer] My sense of the backwardness from which the Nubah Mountains region suffers began early. We debated the subject when we were students in the university. It was our belief that we had to work for the development and advancement of the region. We organized ourselves as an organization. That was at the beginning of the seventies. Among the suggestions was that this idea should spread to other backward areas, such as Darfur, the South, and the East of the Sudan.

These ideas continued to develop. The process was speeded by the behavior of the leadership in Khartoum, which paid no attention to problems such as these. When the People's Movement arose and spread its ideas, I found they agreed with my ideas and theses and that they were the dream for which I was waiting. I believe force is a means, not an end. I am convinced that the existence of the movement has changed many of the concepts that were prevalent in the Sudan. For the first time, the Ummah and other parties have begun speaking about economic balance in the backward areas. Al-Sadiq has begun to represent Darfur and the other regions in the government. These are the reasons for my joining the movement. I arrived at the conviction that talk and other means do not work. Now I am trying force, and I am sure it will work.

[Question] Did any person set forth the movement's ideas to you before you joined?

[Answer] I discovered the movement's program—the Manifesto—and became convinced by it.

[Question] Where did you find the Manifesto?

[Answer] In the Sudan.

[Question] What is the story of the secret cells we hear you have planted in the Nubah Mountains? Is it true that you are going to lead the coming coup in Khartoum?

[Answer] You at AL-RAYAH in particular write many untrue things. I think this interview will get you into trouble, because people suppose—according to what has been published—that I am now in Khartoum.

We shall come to Khartoum and enter it in broad daylight, either peacefully or with guns. We shall not enter Khartoum hiding or under cover of darkness. I believe in armed struggle, not in a coup. Only the former will achieve change.

We are fighting an inferiority and a superiority complex. We feel inferior; but when we bear arms, we feel equality. There are people in the grip of a superiority complex, but who, when they hear bullets, feel weakness and inferiority and begin to come down. We want the sides to be equal.

[Question] But the process of social change is a very complicated process and requires a long time. It cannot be realized by the equality created by the sound of bullets.

[Answer] For this very reason, I do not believe in coups, because they come between one day and the next. I believe in armed struggle. By the way, if the war of the Anya Nya I lasted 17 years, we are ready to fight for another 34 years. A coup is a change that takes place between one day and the next; it is not a real change. Armed struggle is what brings about real change. If we consider all the countries that achieved their independence through armed struggle, we find that after independence they realized their unity and advanced rapidly. The independence of the Sudan took place without that. Those who took power after the departure of the English were true heirs of the English. The problems therefore were not solved. No social or political change took place. Thirty-two years after independence, we remain at the same place where we were standing, despite the existence of human and natural resources and all the components of strength.

[Question] Haven't the wars drained and don't they continue to drain the resources of which you speak?

[Answer] War is a natural result of a minority's control of authority and appropriation of the reins of power in the Sudan.

[Question] But didn't the first rebellion begin in 1955, before independence, and before the minority gained power and ruled the Sudan?

[Answer] The rebellion had its causes and reasons. Let us look for the real causes. Brother, no person carries a gun in order to die silently.

[Question] Then in your view everything going on in Khartoum—democracy, elections, and political parties—is empty talk and children's games?

[Answer] I am really amazed at what is going on now. Are we in the eighties, or have we regressed years? The same old game. What change has taken place? Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi has not changed, and the Mirghanis are still big shots. I think that until the word "sir" ceases to be heard,

the Sudan will not move forward a single step. Even the elections of which you speak—how can they be honest, given the existence of sectarian loyalty?

[Question] We in the Islamic Front believe the Sudan needs change that will realize development and equality. We have presented ideas for how to achieve this. We are against violence and against imposing a view by force. Have you read the documents of the Islamic Front? What is your view of the front?

[Answer] I believe that religion belongs to God and the country belongs to everyone. That is my disagreement with the front, which believes in the unification of religion and state. In my opinion, religion is going to be an element of discrimination in the Sudan.

[Question] Have you read the Sudan Charter presented by the Islamic Front as a proposal for how to govern the Sudan?

[Answer] No, unfortunately.

[Question] We will postpone discussion of this subject until you read this charter, since I think you will then probably change your mind.

[Answer] I am not a fanatic, but there are areas in my thought that I cannot renounce. Among them is the noninclusion of religion in the state. The front demands the implementation of Shari'ah law in an area like the Nubah Mountains, where marisah [native beer] is an important element in all social occasions and in the ordinary life of the people. How can I allow that to happen? How can I force the people to change their life-style?

[Question] Kuwah, you are working—and by force of arms—to change the economic and social system in the Sudan, because you think it is wrong; and then you come and take a stand against prohibiting alcoholic beverages in the Nubah Mountains! Is alcohol a factor in the growth and development of society, so that you defend it?

[Answer] I am for warning the citizen and not forcing religion on him.

[Question] What is your opinion about Sudanese political leaders?

[Answer] In brief, I don't like them, because they do not put the interest of the people and the nation above their partisan interests.

[Question] Why do you take citizens prisoner?

[Answer] We take prisoner those who supply the government with information. Not only that, we try them and execute them.

[Question] Then by the principle of reciprocity we have every right to execute your fifth column?

[Answer] There is no fifth column and no need for one. This fifth column, what is its nature? What?

[Question] Groups that carry information to you and work at sabotage and at frustrating endeavors.

[Answer] They are not a fifth column. They are supporters. They support us, like those who support you. Our ideas are on the table. In light of the democratic system, they are supporting ideas.

[Question] Support against the legitimate government? That we do not accept.

[Answer] What legitimate government?

[Question] The legitimate government that we now accept in the Sudan and that we are working to develop.

[Answer] Your acceptance of the regime is a forced acceptance. Do you think we rebelled without a reason?

[Question] I see you confess that you rebelled!

[Answer] I am a revolutionary rebel. I am working for change. You label the people a fifth column so that you can kill them. You look for justifications to get rid of you opponents. We find support, and from this support we derive our staying power.

[Question] You continue to be the prime obstacle to the realization of peace. It seems your ambition to come to negotiations from a position of strength is the reason for that.

[Answer] Who was it who was serious with us concerning the peace process? During the transition period, the military council spread many lies about contacts with us and about the steps he had taken in order to realize peace. His contact with us took place 60 days after the formation [of the government]. Lieutenant General Yusuf Ahmad Yusuf came to us. They were talking about peace, and at the same time they were preparing their troop concentrations; so the idea of negotiating from a position of strength is the government's idea. After the government was formed, the political parties—I mean the Ummah Party—disavowed their agreement with us in Kokodam. For us, Kokodam was a necessary step to showing good intentions. But you abandoned it. We do not deal with people who are not serious.

[Question] Abandoning Kokodam is not the view of the Ummah Party. The largest parliamentary blocs and political forces did not participate in those meetings. The provisions of the agreement are not acceptable to them.

[Answer] Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi wants the two of us to cancel Kokodam. We are not the only party to Kokodam. This method of cancellation is a dictatorial one, and we are against dictatorship.

[Question] But isn't your insistence on Kokodam blocking the peace process?

[Answer] We do not insist on Kokodam. If all the political forces agree on cancelling it, we do not object. We need mutual trust and frankness in the exchange of opinions. I hope our press will rise to the level of responsibility and avoid the narrow, partisan view. I hope the newspaper that criticizes our party will be fair to its opponents, without slander and insults.

[Question] If that is your view, why don't you do that in your media? Why don't you maintain objectivity and give others their due?

[Answer] We may also be at fault on this point. But we were expecting people of principles and ideals—people like you—to act. We shall learn from you.

[Question] If what you said about lack of the trust that would help achieve peace now is true, in light of the current military activity, do you think a military solution to this conflict is possible?

[Answer] If the situation remains military in this way, yes. It will inevitably be decided, either for us or against us. Whether one wins the war or loses is a matter that neither you nor I decide. You are trying to do away with me; I am trying the opposite.

12937

Garang Agents Reportedly Pressure Former Rebels

45040127A Khartoum AL-RAYAH in Arabic
24 Apr 88 p 1

[Text] Groups of returnees from Garang's movement have begun to be subjected to widespread personal intimidation and pressures on their families and children in the South because of retaliatory activity by elements of John Garang's intelligence that have infiltrated into Khartoum.

Information available to AL-RAYAH states that huge fines, amounting to 350 head of cattle for each gun, have been collected from some of these families as compensation for weapons the returnees have turned in. The possessions of other families have been looted, and their houses have been burned. The wives and children of some returnees have been taken as hostages in the rebel camps.

Investigations by AL-RAYAH have revealed that a list of returnees' names was turned over to leaders of the Mayan station of Garang's movement—the station is located north of Gogrial in Bahr al-Ghazal Region.

Regular reports reach this station from elements located in Khartoum. AL-RAYAH has the names of some of these elements and documents proving their involvement.

AL-RAYAH has learned that these reports are sent by hand with certain citizens overland. In order to do this, they board vehicles from Khartoum to al-Ubayyid, and then proceed via South Kordofan to the Abyei area, and finally to Bahr al-Ghazal.

AL-RAYAH adds that groups of Garang's soldiers, especially men from the Bahr al-Ghazal region, have begun to turn themselves over to the armed forces in various areas. To date, over sixty persons have turned themselves in, including an officer with the rank of 1st lieutenant and others with the rank of 2d lieutenant.

12937

Reasons for DUP-NIF Strife Explored
45040129 Khartroum AL-ASHIQQA' in Arabic
19 Apr 88 pp 4-5

[Text] Relations between the NIF [National Islamic Front] and the DUP [Democratic Unionist Party] have slipped into a deep abyss from which it is difficult to climb out. These relations began to deteriorate as of the time of the 1986 Constituent Assembly elections. The prime minister's announcement of 15 March 1988 and the subsequent political contacts and maneuvers here and there have revealed the clear and obvious designs each party harbors for the other.

The constant deterioration in the two parties' relations does not negate the fact that the two parties' leaderships have met frequently. But these meetings have totally failed to narrow the gap between them. Instead, the two parties have emerged from the meetings more convinced that their steps are moving farther apart, that their fundamental positions are diverging, and that the only common factor between them is suspicion and apprehension.

Fundamental Causes of Strife

There is no doubt that the two parties differ fundamentally in their view of affairs. A quick or preliminary glance at the two parties' names can, for example, clarify one of the fundamental causes of the strife. The DUP is, as indicated by its name and its development, a unionist Arab party by all criteria. It is true that when this party was first founded, its leaders believed that unity with Egypt was possible and necessary. This view was objective when measured by the criteria of the 1950's, when calls for unity between Arab countries with similar

circumstances, such as the Fertile Crescent countries, the Nile Valley countries and so forth, were launched. The firm relationship between the Unionists and the revolutionary Egyptian leadership which seized power in 1952 had its effective impact on the thinking of the DUP leaders. They turned into Unionists leading the ranks calling for comprehensive Arab unity, and often taking revolutionary positions which are compatible with those of the Arab progressive forces and the national liberation forces.

Their view of the African conditions was shaped by the fact of their Arab unionist affiliation. It was natural that the Egyptian leadership's stance toward the Muslim Brotherhood groups would reflect on the relationship between the Unionists and the Islamists.

On the other hand, the Islamists have not, since their emergence, separated the Arab unity issue from the comprehensive framework of Islamic unity. Rather, the Islamists consider Islamic unity the correct starting point for achieving Arab unity.

This historical background, which has continued to form the pivot of the Middle East conflict since the early 1950's, has had its impact on the thinking of the men who wish to steer the rudder of the two parties' affairs.

By virtue of its structure as a loosely knit middle-of-the-road party, the DUP has been able to encompass most of the currents with which the arena abounded before and since independence. This is why the party has found no conflict between its principles and the demands of many of its important sectors that call for applying the Islamic Shari'ah, and why it has found nothing wrong in embracing an Islamic constitution that calls for gradual application, taking Sudan's economic and social circumstances into consideration. By virtue of this same structure, the DUP has continued to cling to its declared position since 1968. Meanwhile, the NIF believes that the circumstances have changed and that application of the Shari'ah will not be met with the rejection with which the Unionists and others believe it will be met. The Unionists respond by saying that Sudan's economic conditions do not permit discussing the border issues now and that establishing social justice after redistributing the wealth vertically and horizontally is the sound basis for a sound application of the Shari'ah.

Ever-Renewed Causes

The 1986 elections helped widen the DUP-NIF rift. Those elections resulted in major NIF successes in districts which the Unionists had believed to be certain to be won by their candidates. The Unionists noticed that the success of the NIF candidates was not due to their large numbers but due to the election message with which the NIF appealed to the DUP masses in all their positions—merchants, employees, workers, and students. The NIF was able to attract broad masses considered to be pro-DUP masses by adopting their special

problems which were generated by the uprising. For example, the NIF was the warm bosom welcoming the uprising's wounded victims who had had no stake whatsoever in the defunct regime. The DUP, the loosely-knit party with the ability to absorb these groups, steered away from these victims. People even saw how reluctant was this party to defend its own men who had been asked to participate in Numayri's regime. The NIF went even further when it projected in the election campaign a program and an organizational structure reflecting the middle class' aspirations. Thanks to that projection, the NIF was able to attract DUP voters.

The NIF's foreign movement has also annoyed the DUP. The Unionists have noticed concerted NIF effort in the Egyptian arena where the NIF has projected itself as a strategic ally. In moving toward Egypt, the NIF leaders have not hesitated to overlook the historical sensitivities and to even give the impression that no ties exist between them and the Egyptian Islamic groups. These leaders have even criticized the theories of some of these groups.

Egypt has not been the sole target of the NIF's movement. Despite the sharp ideological differences between the NIF and the Ba'thists, we have seen the NIF making serious efforts to establish strong relations with Iraq and to turn its back to Iran in spite of their warm previous relations. This means that the NIF has begun to rearrange the priorities of its foreign policy. This rearrangement undermines the DUP's positions. The DUP's annoyance stems from the fact that it is the only Sudanese party (excluding the Arab ideological parties) that has been able to establish excellent Arab relations, resting assured that its ally, the Ummah Party, does not wish to establish special Arab relations.

Subsidiary Causes

The NIF, discovering that it was able to attract with extraordinary ease important cadres considered to be pro-DUP people, has not stopped striking while the iron is hot. It has viewed the outcome of the current elections as the basis for preparing for the coming elections. In this regard, the NIF has moved in two directions:

First, encouraging reluctant people who have joint political and economic interests with the NIF to abandon the DUP and join the NIF. Some DUP members have actually begun to do so, especially since they have noticed that the DUP does not plan to revise its positions in the near future.

Second, intimidation. The NIF has used this tool skillfully in its various newspapers. It has not allowed a single negative detail pertaining to the DUP leaders to go unpublicized.

Some of the NIF papers have specialized in bestowing nicknames on DUP leaders and in using these nicknames so extensively until they replace the real names. The NIF

has also kept an extremely persistent and patient watch on all the DUP leaders' movements, neglecting nothing—not even their private lives. The NIF's successive propaganda campaigns have left deep wounds in the body of the Unionist leaderships, and these campaigns have often obstructed the meetings of DUP leaders here and there. These papers have also gone so far in making unsubstantiated statements, and in engaging in unobjective instigation, that they bring to mind the odious memory of the Sudanese and non-Sudanese sensationalist press.

These campaigns have never been stopped under the canopy of any reconciliation endeavor made in the past two years. The DUP leaders have felt that these campaigns ultimately seek to deprive the party of its leadership by either forcing them to retreat and withdraw, or to move closer or seek proximity to the NIF. The DUP leaderships consider these campaigns an attempt to harm and slight the status and history of the party and of its leaders. This has undoubtedly helped to widen the gap between the DUP and the NIF and to make dialogue between them difficult.

The Razor Is Getting Close to the Neck

When al-Sadiq made his well-known announcement on 15 March 1988, the Unionists rushed to revive their contacts with the NIF under the canopy of "forming a national government." In his turn and for his own reasons, al-Sadiq rushed to overcome this tactic by making a written agreement with the NIF to form a national unity government. The Unionists felt that matters were moving contrary to their wishes, that the NIF's entry into the government was about to become a reality based on the agreement with al-Sadiq, and that the following would materialize as a result of such a state of affairs:

1. The next government will adopt the most significant points in the NIF program.
2. The executive positions will be redistributed so that the NIF may get its share.
3. The redistribution will be made at the expense of the Unionists' positions.
4. The NIF will break the blockade which the Unionists thought they had imposed on it regarding supplying services to their voters.

What Kind of Future?

The numerous abovementioned causes have created an immense barrier between the two parties. It is difficult to say that the current negotiations to reach a charter that unites the major parties in the assembly can eliminate this barrier. Crossing this barrier takes a long time. In this case, the desired crossing does not so much seek to achieve rapprochement as it seeks to enable the ship of

government to reach the shore of safety in the coming period. If both parties enter al-Sadiq's next government with the same bitterness, apprehension, and suspicion that govern their current movements, then the government encompassing them will last no more than a few weeks.

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SYRIA

Industrial Potential of Mineral Resources Surveyed

44040228B Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
23 Apr 88 p 7

[Article by Marwan Darraj: "Our Earth Resources: From Relative Exploitation to Continuous Prospecting and Exploration"]

[Text] Usable earth resources have been the cornerstone of peoples' economic and civilizational development throughout history. Optimum utilization of these resources in the various fields of building construction and mining is the epitome of progress and civilization. In our Syrian Arab country, we have numerous different underground resources in the form of oil, gas and metallic and non-metallic wealth, some of which are being mined to some extent while others are still in the prospecting and exploration stage. In this report we will deal exclusively with hard earth resources through an interview held with Dr Fawwaz al-Rumani, assistant director general of the General Geological Institute. Oil and gas will be discussed in a future report.

Hard Ore Minerals

At the present time, based on established world standards, usable hard ore minerals found within Syrian territory that are being mined or are under economic feasibility studies may be divided as follows:

—Metallic ore minerals: iron; chromium; copper.

—Non-metallic ore minerals: diamonds; sulfur; phosphate; rock salt; gypsum; building construction and manufacturing materials, including limestone and marl, dolomite, clay, quartzite sands, triplite, asbestos, volcanic tuff, basalt.

—Penetrable hard ore materials: oil shale; asphalt; carboniferous sedimentary rock.

Now that we have shown how hard ore minerals are divided, we will try to offer information and some quick remarks about those mentioned above with an essential explanation of the significance of each of them.

Metallic Ore Minerals

Iron

Geological research and investigative studies set iron ore reserves in the country at 400 million tons scattered over several regions, in addition to other deposits estimated at around 61 million tons. Technical and economic studies have been conducted on this ore, including determination of reserves, market studies, mining techniques, treatment and concentration operations and steel manufacturing.

This study concluded that the use of blast furnaces with imported coal is essential. Study results show that the manufacture of domestic ores is technically and economically possible and reasonably profitable. These results have been presented to the country's higher authorities for appropriate action in terms of mining.

Chromite

Geological studies and mining operations point to the existence of hundreds of chromite ore lenticles in certain regions. The small size of the chromite particles notwithstanding, minerals of the technical ore type make its use in concentrated form possible in various industries. We must note here that the amounts of chromite ore in our country are limited and do not warrant its mining and concentration for export. However, large particles of this ore may be exploited to meet part of the domestic dyeing and tanning industry's needs, provided that a simple, uninvolved and inexpensive process is used. We must note here that this mineral is still under research and study.

Copper

Expert studies conducted in the early sixties confirmed the existence of malachite ore in penetrable rocks containing copper oxides. Through work undertaken by national elements a few years ago, three new sites of copper deposits have been found. Some prospecting and mining work has been done and chemical analyses have confirmed that baggro and diabase rocks have a 25 percent copper content, ranging from 2 to 14.6 percent. A systematic plan has been drawn up to intensify geological, geophysical and geochemical studies to determine the origin and extension of areas where copper is found and the amounts and economics thereof. However, this metal has not yet been exploited.

Non-Metallic Ores

Diamond

As a result of works and studies conducted in the last 4 years, diamond-associated ores have been found and whole and parts of eight and twelve-sided diamond

crystals have been spotted in several locations. Exploratory studies are still under way and some tests have been conducted (quasi-manufacturing tests with the hope of mining it in the near future).

Phosphate

Phosphate deposits of economic significance are concentrated in the southern Palmyra Range. In some mines, phosphate layers are 7 meters thick and sometimes up to 19 meters thick. Geological studies have uncovered phosphate ore reserves in several locations in the country. One mine has an estimated reserve of 25 million tons, other reserves amount to 14 million tons and in some places, reserves are estimated at 244 million tons. It is common knowledge that phosphate production in our country has grown considerably in the last 10 years, beginning in 1980. Total production in 1986 amounted to about 1.6 million tons and current production is 2.5 million tons. Thus, phosphate exports now represent an important source of hard currency for the country. Plans have been drawn up to raise phosphate production to 5.7 million tons annually. Nonetheless, this production is plagued with certain difficulties such as the high water content of phosphate deposits and the presence of chlorine. This problem, however, has been solved through dehydration plants.

Rock Salt

Rock salt layers are found in several regions of the country with huge concentrations in al-'Arumashiyah where the upper layer is 9 meters thick with an average salt content of 96.13 percent. The second layer is 12 meters thick with an average salt content of 93.76 percent. Industrial reserves have been estimated in this location at about 84.5 million tons for both layers. Salt is also found in many other regions such as al-Tibni region where approximately 65 tons are mined annually. In addition, there are saltworks and salt lakes scattered throughout the country, including al-Jubul, Jayrud, Palmyra and al-Bawwarah saltworks. Pure salt obtained from these saltworks is used for eating and for industrial purposes if the salt is not pure, as is the case with the Jayrud saltworks. In addition, while prospecting for sulfur, several layers of salt, about 150 meters thick, were found in the al-Jazirah region. In recent years, salt production grew considerably, reaching 113 million tons in 1986 compared to about 70 million tons in 1970.

Gypsum

Gypsiferous rocks are widespread in the northeastern regions. Gypsiferous sand deposits have also been sighted in the Jayrud region near Damascus.

Gypsiferous rocks have been studied in numerous regions, al-Raqqah, Latakia and Jayrud in particular, to determine their industrial usability. These studies show that gypsum ore is available in amounts and varieties suitable for this industry (plaster of Paris, plasterboard).

Reserves of 27 million tons in Latakia, 10 million tons in Jayrud and large amounts in al-Raqqah, containing up to 98 percent pure varieties, have been reported. In addition to the aforementioned uses, gypsite and anhydrite rocks are used as ornamental stones in interior design due to their desirable colors and shapes.

Sulfur

Sulfur is used in a number of general industries such as the fertilizer and heavy chemical industry, the dyeing industry, the paper and rubber industry, the explosives industry, the mining industries, the food preservation industry and other sundry industries. Prospecting and exploration operations have been undertaken in the northeastern part of Syria, concentrating mostly on al-Hasakah Province. Studies and automated drilling operations have uncovered sulfur ore formations in the form of yellow porous sulfur crystals in limestone. Work completed at al-Buwayd uncovered a 185-210 meter deep sulfur bearing layer and several other limestone layers with a 12-22 percent sulfur content in some places. Onsite prospecting focused on the identification of sulfur-bearing limestone layers and the percentage of their sulfur content. So far, sulfur formations have been discovered in al-Dibanah and the percentage of free sulfur in al-Buwayr is set at 0.8 to 22 percent. Drilling operations are still under way at the site with a view to determining its importance. Prospecting and evaluation work is expected to be completed soon. Moreover, studies and automated drilling operations under way in the Ras al-'Ayn region point to the presence of significant amounts of sulfur deposits, most notably those with a high percentage of hydrogen sulfide and sulfuric water. In addition, beds in 40 other areas in northeast Syria possibly containing sulfur deposits will be studied in coming years.

Building Construction and Manufacturing Materials

Limestone and Marl:

Limestone and marl are widespread in Syria and are found in most successive rock layers. Calcareous sandstone is the oldest known limestone. The provinces of Aleppo and Hamah are known for their yellowish white clay limestone that is easy to extract, but hard and resistant enough to be used as building stone. Hard crystalline limestone is used in building construction and ornamentation and special varieties thereof are polished into marble. Studies also confirmed the existence of new and pure varieties of limestone suitable for the cement, the chemical and other industries in several regions of the country, particularly in the eastern Lebanon Range and the Palmyra Range in Aleppo, Idlib and the coastal areas.

As for marl rocks and greensand limestone, they are also widespread and an important ingredient in the manufacture of cement. Moreover, marl and greensand clay deposits are found near al-Mayadin in Dayr al-Zur

Province. We would like to point out here that marl and greensand limestone are mined in large amounts by private sector quarries. In reply to a question about the reason the public sector has abstained from mining this mineral, it was said that this would be economically unfeasible.

Dolomite:

Dolomite is widespread in Syria in the Coastal, the Eastern and the Palmyra Ranges, in certain northern regions such as Jarablus and in northeastern regions such as Bukamal and al-Rasafah. Dolomite rock can be more than several hundred meters thick, up to 650 meters in the coastal mountains. These rocks are usually used for various building and construction work and the pure varieties can be used as furnace casings and as a smelting agent as well as in the manufacture of glass and chemical fertilizers. The General Geological Institute conducted an economic and technical study on the establishment of a dolomite fire brick industry with a view to limiting importation of heat-resistant stones used in the manufacture of cement, steel and other materials. Tests show that material found in the country is adequate for this purpose but the output capacity needed to cover local market needs is small, about 10,000 tons, thus rendering the plant uneconomical because minimum output must be about 20,000 tons annually. Hence, this mineral has not been mined.

Greensand Clay:

Greensand clay deposits are spread throughout the country and found mainly in lower cretaceous formation and are used in the manufacture of porcelain and ceramics. Moreover, laterite clay resulting from basalt exposure is used in the manufacture of bricks and in the Aleppo region (Tal Jamal) clay deposits known as bentonite are used in drilling fluids. In addition, numerous other clay deposits used in the manufacture of cement are also available.

As for the most economically feasible clay beds, they are found in several regions. Clay deposits in the regions of al-Zabadani, Judaydah, Yabus, al-Kafir and al-Taktah are used in the manufacture of porcelain at the Hamah plant. Reserves in this region are set at 689,102.4 tons. Clay deposits are also found in al-Tayyas area which supplies the Hamah porcelain factory with 88,330.75 tons. There are also the Palmyra clay deposits used in the manufacture of porcelain, ceramics, bricks and cement and the northeastern clay deposits, the most significant beds of which are located in al-Raqqah and al-Hasakah provinces. They are red in color and used in the manufacture of firebricks. They are currently being mined by the Military Housing Establishment. In addition to the afore-mentioned areas, there are similar deposits in Idlib, Homs and al-Suwaydah that can be used in the manufacture of brick.

Quartzite:

Quartzite and quartzite sandstone is found in several formations in successive rock layers in Syria. They are between 15 and 25 meters thick and reddish in color due to their high iron oxide content which makes them unsuitable for use in the manufacture of glass. The most prominent quartzite beds in Syria are found in the following regions:

Al-Qaryatayn region: This bed has a reserve of 50 million tons and the annual consumption is about 200,000 tons, part of which goes to the two glass factories in Damascus and Aleppo. Sand in this bed is of the finest quality ever discovered in Syria.

Damascus region: Quartzite sands deposited at the foot of Abu 'Ata Mountain and at al-Thanaya, al-Nabak and Yabrud, are used in building construction and the manufacture of cement. The Yabrud area has especially high quality varieties used in the manufacture of high-grade glass (crystal and optical glass). Sand in the said areas represents a relatively large reserve exceeding tens of millions of tons.

Al-Bushari and al-Tabut Mountains: Sand in this region is not suitable for the manufacture of glass, but can be used to manufacture building materials.

Al-Raqqah: Sand in this region is used in the manufacture of tile, porcelain and cement. Available figures indicate that this mineral has been mined in large amounts. For example, the 1979 production amounted to 73,000 tons and rose to 528,000 tons in 1986.

Asbestos:

Asbestos (amiantus) is used in the manufacture of pressure resistant-pipes and tinplates. Due to its importance to the domestic industry, the General Geological and Mineral Resources Institute conducted a study of asbestos deposits in Ra's al-Basit area. These studies unveiled asbestos veins in rock fissures in the said area. This year, sites covered by the study have been explored and a new site, the "Kuwarah al-Dabba" Mountain, was recently discovered. Samples taken from this site have been sent to Cyprus and Yugoslavia for technological and laboratory analysis. In light of the results, the need for exploration and mining operations to meet the need for amiantus cement will be determined.

Triplite:

Triplite rocks, ranging in thickness from 4 to 6 meters, are found in the Palmyra Range where various geological studies have been conducted, including geological surveys and mine drilling. These studies confirm that these rocks are widely available in large quantities and chemical and physical specifications. Triplite is used in refining operations, that of liquids and mineral oils in particular. It is also used in the manufacture of paint, paint

compounds and rubber; as an insulator in building construction; in the manufacture of special types of cement and heat-resistant material; and in the manufacture of porcelain.

With regard to mining this mineral, technological tests and manufacturing specifications are under way. If economic and practical feasibility for the afore-mentioned uses is established, this mineral can replace numerous manufactured materials imported into the country for use in refining operations and for the manufacture of sulfur-resistant cement to meet the country's needs with a possible surplus for export.

Volcanic Tuff:

Volcanic tuff is distinguished by its many uses as a building material substitute. The General Geological and Mineral Resources Institute conducted an economic-technical study to determine its ideal use, such as in the manufacture of tuff wool and prefabricated walls and light-weight hollow blocks and to supply cement factories with volcanic tuff for use in the manufacture of bozoline cement.

Studies have established the possibility of manufacturing said material with good specifications, for large amounts of this material are found in "Tal Shayhan" area and other areas in al-Suwaydah Province.

Basalt:

Due to the lack of limestone available for construction in the southern area, studies focused on finding a basalt-based substitute since basalt is abundant in these areas. The geological institute prepared an economic-technical study for mining basalt for use in building construction, sidewalks and as railroad track gravel. The study found that using basalt stones in construction saves large amounts of cement and iron due to the fact that basalt walls are strong and sturdy.

Combustible Ore Minerals

Oil Shale

Oil shale deposits are found in several regions, most notably the Yarmuk Valley and al-Qalamun. Significant deposits are also found in Dar'a where detailed studies have established the presence of oil shale in the area under study at the top and bottom levels. Top level reserves are estimated at 240 million tons. Oil shale is used in various fields, including direct combustion at power plants, extraction of industrial liquid fuel and production of various chemical materials used in the manufacture of various kinds of building materials. Preparations are currently under way for an economic feasibility study on shale oil in the Dar'a bed.

Asphalt

Asphalt rocks are found in two main areas: Kafariyah in Latakia and al-Bushari Mountain. Detailed studies of the Kafariyah area conducted in 1985 concluded that the area had 16 million tons in grade-B reserves and one million tons in reserves of various other grades.

As for the al-Bushari area, asphalt is found in two places: Wadi al-Qammar, which has a geological reserve of about 96 million tons, and Sha'fat al-Bushari. The geological institute is in the process of conducting a new detailed study of asphalt to beef up the existing reserve.

Asphalt rocks are used mainly in the manufacture of asphalt tiles, asphalt paper, insulating blocks used in road pavement and many other industries. This is in addition to its use in power generation. Large amounts of this ore were exploited in 1979 when 38,500 tons were mined. This amount dropped to 12,790 tons in 1986 due to a drop in the manufacture of asphalt-based commodities and the fact that it cannot be stored. As for asphalt putty, about 14,250 tons were produced in 1979 and 7,990 tons in 1986. An economic and technical study is under way to develop and improve the quality of bitumen-rich Kafariyah—al-Bushari asphalt for use in the manufacture of various kinds of paints and tiles.

Carboniferous Sedimentary Rock

These rocks have been found close to the surface in al-Utaybah Lake area in Damascus. Preliminary studies, including automated and mine drilling conducted in this area, uncovered these deposits and samples were collected to determine their thermal capacity. The results were as follows:

The percentage of sulfur is between 2.3 and 6 percent and that of ash, between 14 and 40 with a thermal capacity between 230 and 1,800 kilograms. Based on available information, the entire lake area will be studied with a view to evaluating the availability of this mineral which is usually used for combustion, soil enrichment and other uses.

In Conclusion:

Attention must be called to the fact that the economic feasibility of any material can be determined by looking at it from the overall perspective of development in the country.

For example, a substance like carbonaceous deposits may not be economical for combustion and power generation in the classical sense or if compared to world deposits, but they can be used economically in refining and soil enrichment operations and other economically profitable uses. The same thing goes for asbestos, triplite

and other materials that can meet the country's needs for a certain period of time and, if properly used and exploited, can save the country much money paid out in hard currency.

12502

Writer Criticizes U.S. Peace Plan

44040*28A Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
30 Apr 88 p 3

[Article by Muhammad Khayr al-Jamali: "Nothing New in the American Policy Except Stronger Support for Israel and Denial of Arab Rights"]

[Text] It is wrong to believe that American concern with the Middle East situation, that became manifest in the last 4 months via the shuttle trips a number of American officials (Shultz, Murphy and Habib) undertook in the area, was spurred by the desire to establish a just peace in the region or is based on a serious new position on the Arab-Israeli conflict different from previous U.S. stances during the past two decades. This is evidenced by the background of the current American concern with the Middle East situation and by the form and content of the American settlement based on this concern.

Background of American Concern

American concern with the Middle East situation is a sudden one dictated by the occupied homeland's uprising as a new development representing a Palestinian national challenge of pan-Arab proportions to both the Zionist entity and the United States through a set of consequences and facts this challenge has so far engendered, the most salient of which are:

First, refuting the notion of coexistence between Jews and Arabs in occupied Palestine, be they the Arabs who have been under occupation since 1948 or those who came under occupied in 1967, a fact made manifest by the uprising's universality in areas occupied in 1948 and 1967 and by raising the slogan of liberation, independence and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

Even though many Zionist leaders are determined to ignore this fact in keeping with the passion for expansion and occupation dominating their way of thinking and behavior, their determination does not in any way change this reality. Indeed, this fact has prompted some of them to change their way of thinking, perforce departing, however, from their concern for the future of the Zionist being. Perhaps Yahu Shaffat Harkabi, considered one of the "hard-line" Zionists, is one of those leaders, for he admits to the difficulty of the occupation crisis growing out of the refutation of the coexistence notion, by saying: "The choice we face is not between good and bad, for any child can determine that. The choice is between bad and worse. Israel cannot dominate the Palestinians and we must recognize their rights to

political expression within their own entity, namely a state established on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Reality will compel Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories...." (Footnote 1)

Second, refutation of the course of capitulation with all its intellectual and material pivots and all American and Zionist hopes built on the possibility of popularizing and selling this policy at the Arab level as an alternative to the confrontation and struggle trend. This fact has been manifested by the fact that the outbreak of the uprising has arrested efforts aimed at implementing the policy's Palestinian aspect by liquidating the Palestinian cause through post-Camp David negotiations.

Third, disregarding the American role in confronting the conflict and exposing it for what it really is: a useless role in search of a just and lasting peace lacking efficacy and credibility and so biased toward the Zionist enemy that it has failed throughout its history to give any weight or consideration to the Palestinian Arab people's inalienable national rights which are the crux of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the central reason for the conflict's rise and development.

These and many other consequences arising from the Arab Palestinian people's uprising inside the occupied homeland have compelled the United States and Israel to view the uprising as the chief source of danger, both to American interests in the region and the future of the Zionist entity's functional role and to the American surrogate regimes, such as the Egyptian and Moroccan ones, during the current state for one specific reason: the outcome of the uprising will have an immediate impact on the course of post-conflict events certainly not in line with American and Zionist policy and common interests. George Shultz acknowledged this fact after conducting massive consultations with former secretary of state Henry Kissinger who originated the step-by-step doctrine and in the wake of his shuttle tours prompted by conditions growing out of the uprising as he came to realize that Palestinian "violence" is not a problem for Israel alone, but rather for all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Here, we must examine closely the term, "all parties," for this term has been used by Shultz to warn the Arabs against supporting the uprising and to goad them into flocking around any future U.S. initiative aimed at dealing with conditions emanating from the uprising.

In view of this American attitude toward the uprising and by understanding it for what it really is: a source of danger threatening American interests in the region and impeding Israel's functional role of fulfilling its Zionist and imperialist tasks, the motives of American concern with the situation in the region can be outlined in one single direction: to besiege the uprising and its immediate consequences and to nullify its efficacy and impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Based on this attitude, the United States formulated its settlement plan in the region through a set of ideas that brought nothing new save for more conspiracies against the Arabs, persistent denial of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, as a prelude to putting a stop to the uprising and liquidating the Palestinian cause, both people and land. A look back at the main points included in the American settlement concepts explains much about the secrets behind the new American conspiracy against the Arabs.

American Settlement Plan

Based on leaked information about Shultz's latest two tours and the settlement proposals he carried with him, the plan carrying his name included a number of measures, the most important of which are: (Footnote 2)

First, the UN secretary general would call for an international conference with the participation of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council as well as Israel, a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and Syria. The permanent members of the UN Security Council would not be authorized to impose a settlement on the two parties.

Second, during the international conference, bilateral regional committees, made up of Israeli representatives and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, would be formed to discuss details of phased settlements and to conduct direct negotiations on the nature of autonomy on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. This would be a 3-year agreement to be implemented in February 1989. Should Syria join the process, a second bilateral Israeli-Syrian committee would be formed.

Third, regional committees would operate for a period of 6 months ending at the end of October 1988.

Fourth, in exchange, in the month of October, the phased settlement would be put into effect by holding autonomy council elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Fifth, on 1 December, negotiations on a permanent settlement would begin, to be conducted without any consideration to the level of progress reached in the phased settlement negotiations or the pace at which the settlement is implemented.

Fundamental Observations

A close examination of the American settlement's features and trends, as contained in the Shultz paper, clearly evokes a set of observations that intersect at a single specific point which is that the new American settlement plan is no different than other previous American ones, such as the 1970 Rogers plan, aimed at putting a stop to the war of attrition against Israel; the Kissinger plan put forth in 1973 to absorb the October War's consequences and impact on the Zionist entity and American interests;

and the 1977 Camp David plan and subsequent accords put forth with a view to fragmenting Arab confrontation with the Zionist plan and its alliance with the United States as a prelude to imposing capitulation on the Arabs. These observations are outlined in the following points:

1. The international conference, to which the United States has agreed, is a pro forma conference devoid of any content. It is nothing but a ceremonial ritual aimed at paving the way for direct negotiations between the Arabs and the Zionist entity and bearing false testimony to the results of these negotiations. This observation is attested to by the fact that the United States made it conditional that the conference not be authorized to impose a settlement on the two parties, in accordance with Article I of the settlement. In so doing, the United States intended to obstruct any active role the international community may play in discussions aimed at finding objective solutions to issues growing out of the conflict because such a role and any possible vision for solving these issues would represent a clear contradiction to American interests and the settlement that guarantees the survival of these interests. This is made evident by the fact that active participation by the UN Security Council members in the conference affords the opportunity to discuss the Palestinian issue and see that justice is done to the Palestinian people, something the United States and Israel do not want because it takes the conflict back to its historical roots. In this regard, Yitzhak Shamir, the Zionist prime minister, said: "The international conference, based on the proposed criteria, will not advance peace a single centimeter, but rather would be used as a tool to pressure Israel and I do not agree to it." (Footnote 3)

2. Disregard for the PLO's right to represent the Palestinian Arab people and speak for them despite the fact that this right has been guaranteed by the international community that granted the PLO its observer status in the United Nations in its capacity as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Such disregard is evidenced by the fact that Palestinian representation has been confined to a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, as stipulated in the same Article I under the term "a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation," most likely with the purpose of denying the existence of a Palestinian cause and a people that symbolize it.

3. Fragmentation of issues arising from the conflict and reducing the struggle's fundamental concept to regional matters, such as disputes over geographic boundaries among neighboring nations and peoples, in order to refute the conflict's fundamental concept that it is a struggle for existence spurred by settlement colonialism marked by an ingrained tendency for expansion and replacement of an entire people on the ruins of their culture and civilization. This is the same trend stipulated in Article II of the settlement plan which called for the formation of bilateral regional committees to discuss details of phased settlements.

4. Disregard for the legitimate demands of the Palestinian Arab people and their inalienable national rights, foremost of which is the right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state on their land, a right guaranteed by the UN charter and UN resolutions issued on the Palestinian question. This is attested to by the fact that when it comes to dealing with the Palestinian issue, the American settlement plan is based on the autonomy conspiracy which has been unanimously rejected by the Palestinian people in all its forms and details.

Future Trend

This plan, which by virtue of its provisions and orientations is no different from American settlement plans proposed during the last two decades, will continue to represent in form and content a fixed framework for any future American settlement plan, even under a new American administration. For America's interests and strategic alliance with Israel always presuppose the existence of plans that do not depart from the framework of a settlement based on continued support for Israel and firm denial of the national and pan-Arab rights of the Arabs and the Palestinian people. This is made most evident by a report (Footnote 4) put out by a group of American experts outlining the course of the next American administration's policy, as follows:

—The United States must dictate the details of the settlement and must immediately embark on the peace process as soon as the next president is installed, on the basis of "peace in exchange for territories." Consider carefully the use of the term "territories" instead of all territories!

The absence of a political initiative may lead to a war between Israel and Syria, thus exposing American interests in the area to danger.

—An international conference is not the desired tool but there is no better alternative.

—The Palestinians must be represented by spokesmen chosen by them. This represents a rallying around PLO representation of the Palestinian people.

—Palestinians in the occupied areas during the phased period would, in the interim, benefit from diminished Israeli military presence in heavily populated areas.

—Syria must benefit from participation in the peace process. This view, stated in the American report, was expressed with utmost clarity by the American assistant secretary of state Richard Murphy when he said: "The American initiative is not open to changes and through our contacts with the various countries, we are actually studying various ideas. However, there will be no change in the principles that form the basis of the initiative." (Footnote 5)

Hence, the only conclusion that can be derived in light of the details of the American settlement plan is that this plan, in its entire content, is nothing but an American attempt earnestly striving to save Israel from its current ordeal with the uprising and from future threats to its being. George Shultz, the American secretary of state who tried to wrap his plan with a peace endeavor, does not ignore this fact, for he says: "Israel must focus on the fact that a very large clock is clearly ticking like a demographic time-bomb", meaning the Palestinian people and their uprising, "and it is necessary to tackle the problem one way or another. It is imperative that this not be ignored and that steps taken in preparation for peace are most important and must be implemented."

"Israel is the one that stands to profit from peace economically and in terms of security." (Footnote 6) Shultz failed to realize, however, that his equation for the Arab-Israeli conflict remains a hypothesis lacking the most elemental proof of validity in the face of unequivocal Arab rejection.

Footnotes

1. The HERALD TRIBUNE, 11 Mar 88, quoting American writer Anthony Lewis.
2. HA'ARETZ, 6 March 88.
3. Ibid, 11 Mar 88.
4. DAFAR, 24 Mar 88.
5. Ibid, 18 Feb 88.
6. Op. cit. HA'ARETZ, 6 Mar 88.

TUNISIA

Minister of Economy Discusses New Policies, Maghreb Integration

45000092 Limassol MEMO in English May 88 pp 9-11

[Interview with Minister of Economy Slaheddine Ben Mbarek by Al-Arousi Al-Amri, date and place not given]

[Text] Economists have always occupied a prominent position in Tunisian political hierarchy. Suffice it to remember that two economists have already attained the premiership: Mr Hadi Noueiri who left his mark on Tunisian policies during the seventies, then Mr Rachid Safar.

In turn, Tunisia's present minister of economy, Mr Slaheddine Ben Mbarek, enjoys the reputation of an efficient economist who kept away from political struggles that shook Tunisia during the last 20 years. Thus, his appointment to this position was in recognition of his honesty, experience, and profound knowledge of economic issues, whether local or in relation with Arab and foreign partners.

[Question] Did the 7 November change bring about a new economic outlook, or are Tunisia's present economic policies a mere continuation of the Bourguiba line?

[Answer] There is a new outlook, and a new philosophy in the economic domain since 7 November. This view could be summarized by the liberalization of the economy—and, most important, determining the means to achieve this liberalization without prejudicing national production, and foreign trade balances.

This new orientation enjoys the confidence of both local and foreign investors alike, which is quite important after the (pre-7 November) crisis characterized by the decline of investments, and the lack of sufficient means to reactivate the economic cycle. Thus, our first task was to recuperate this confidence through adopting economic regulations and administrative measures necessary to reactivate the economic cycle, and to encourage investments, especially in sectors of high integration ratio, that is of better competitiveness in the export markets. The new president of Tunisia has signed the measures necessary to liberalize the economy, limit the adverse effects of (bureaucratic) routine, and remedy consumption policies.

Thus, the series of customs and taxes exemptions, and the new banking measures, are likely to have positive economic and, most important, psychological effects.

The new regime has created a new impetus through measures to encourage individual initiative and industrial creativity. The new authorities are willing to provide the necessary conditions for the success of new investments—that, in the interest of the national economy, and employment. Our economic philosophy today is based on the slogan: yes to a free and dynamic economy, without any prejudice to social achievements.

[Question] Some observers claim that the liberalization measures were adopted under pressure from the World Bank and the IMF. Would you confirm, or deny, such claims taking into consideration the adverse effects of liberalization on economic balances?

[Answer] Our liberalization policy is the frame through which we intend to implement a global reform program that goes further than foreign trade, and international competitiveness considerations. Our objective, in addition to the increasing and progressive liberalization of the economy, is to provide the conditions that would allow the domestic trade and the consumers market in general to provoke a new economic dynamism liable to attract local and foreign investments, that would give rise to new industries and more employment.

The liberalization of our economy in its different sectors (investments, consumption and foreign trade) would provide it with the flexibility and efficiency that represent the basic conditions to improve both productivity

and quality. Another advantage is that liberalization would force us to engage in the universal struggle for competitiveness. For growth cannot be attained by closing borders. It is only attained through providing the conditions of economic progress—through exchanges, persistence, and the acceptance of the laws of supply and demand.

We have provided our economy with the necessary conditions to engage in the stage of free competition. Thus, the tax system was revised. Exemptions from certain duties were approved. This was accompanied by the lowering of stamp duties, and the simplification of bureaucratic procedures. All of these moves should provide a better protection for national production, and promote exports.

Further, certain public enterprises are to be denationalized. This would lessen the burden supported by the state and the people, put an end to the policies of state subsidies and favour efficiency. In this context, it should be noted that many public enterprises which never achieved their production goals, still exist through state subsidies alone. The liberalization policy is thus intended to favour economic feasibility. The sectors directly affected by denationalization operations include tourism, textiles, construction materials, and commerce.

All such measures are one hundred percent Tunisian. And all have been decided by the new regime. It is noteworthy, however, that our reform program has had favourable echoes in world financial circles, including the World Bank and the IMF who provided their assistance. Yet, such positive reactions do not imply that we are applying policies decided on our behalf.

[Question] How do you evaluate the realities and perspectives of common economic action in the Maghreb?

[Answer] Let us start with the perspectives, which are considerable and beneficial for the five countries concerned. For, united, we represent an important human and political bloc on the international level, which is why we are for any rapprochement.

In fact, the world is progressing towards more integration. That would be the case of Europe as of 1992. Similarly, the Arab Gulf countries have taken the first steps in this direction. We wish them good results in their integration efforts. The same could be said of Asia, Latin America and Africa. The only remaining area whose characteristics favour integration is the Maghreb....

We believe that integration is indispensable. It would promote trade exchanges, and provide incentives (through a larger market) to industrial projects whether by the private or the public sector. It is no secret that many Tunisian projects were not realized because they lacked a sufficient market. Certain projects were not

feasible even on a Maghreb level. Yet, many projects would be feasible in a Maghreb whose population should attain 100 million inhabitants by the end of the century.

The Maghreb's resources are complementary whether in the domains of energy, agriculture, light and heavy industry, sea ports and geography. Thus, North Africa has all the means of effective economic power through integration.

It is noteworthy, to point out, that entities like the EEC prefer treating with Maghreb countries as a bloc.

[Question] Leaving such perspectives aside, what about the present situation?

[Answer] Tunisia is making every effort to develop bilateral relations with its neighbours. It will persist in this policy until such could be replaced by trilateral and...multilateral relations.... Global industrial accords have been signed with Algeria, with which we have started eight joint ventures including the "Firyana" white cement factory, etc.... Joint ventures with Algeria include the gas pipeline project. On the other hand, our trade exchanges with Morocco have doubled in 1987, in comparison with 1986. Our trade relations with Mauritania are, also, excellent. Now that our political relations with Libya have been normalized, we are making efforts to consolidate economic and trade cooperation with that country. The recent visit of Tunisia's prime minister to the Jamahiriya (to prepare the meeting of the joint economic committee) is an example of our intention to make further progress in the domain of economic cooperation.

[Question] Does this orientation include the Arab Orient which complements the economics of the Maghreb, as well as facing this same challenge?

[Answer] After Algeria, the first state visit undertaken by President Bin Ali was to Saudi Arabia. This was the first visit on such a level for 25 years. This indicates that our current policies accord a priority to relations with Arab countries. It should be mentioned that President Bin Ali's visit to Saudi Arabia had been successful on all levels. Cooperation is certain to go further thanks to the directives of H. M. King Fahd and President Bin Ali. I have recently signed an accord allowing for more commodity exchanges between the two countries.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia is to grant Tunisia some economic aid to face emergency situations (such as drought, and the invasion of locusts).

On the level of multilateral relations, the Arab league has called for a forum, to be held in autumn, on Arab investments in Tunisia. A previous forum had been organized by Tunisia, 6 months ago, to discuss possibilities of Saudi investments in the country. To encourage this orientation, we have adopted a new investments law (1987) that includes procedural and administrative facilities destined to attract Arab capital. It should be noted that Tunisia offers unique advantages to investors in such sectors as industry, agriculture, tourism and international commerce. This should be appreciated above all by Arab investors.

We hope that Arab businessmen will prove receptive to our propositions, especially that our current 5-year development plan envisages a total of \$900 million of investments, or \$180 million per year. Most of these investments shall be undertaken by the private sector—an interesting point of view for foreign investors.

in any case, Tunisia is ready to adapt its economic laws with a view to taking any new developments into consideration.

/9604

AFGHANISTAN

Czech Youth End Visit; Cooperation Protocol Signed

46000147c Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English
9 May 88 p 4

[Text] A delegation of the Union of Czechoslovak Socialist Youth led by its Central Committee Secretary, that had come here at the invitation of the Youth Central Committee of Afghanistan, left Kabul yesterday.

At the Kabul airport the delegation was seen off by Secretary of the Central Committee and authorities of the DYOA.

According to another report, Najmuddin Kawyani, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA, yesterday received in his office the Czechoslovak delegation.

Present at the meeting were Farid Ahmad Mazdak, first secretary of the Central Committee of DYOA, and Bhuslav Handle, Czechoslovak ambassador in Kabul.

Views were exchanged on matters of mutual interest. Farid Ahmad Mazdak also met the Czechoslovak delegation. Also present at the meeting was Bhuslav Handle, Czechoslovak ambassador. Further cooperation between the youth of two countries was on the agenda of the meeting. A protocol was signed between the DYOA and the Union of Czechoslovak Socialist Youth for 1988-1990 on the Afghan side by Daoud Mazvar, secretary of the DYOA, and on the Czechoslovak side by the head of the delegation.

/9604

Youth Reportedly Join Army

46000147b Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English
8 May 88 p 2

[Text] Over 1,100 youth of Kabul city have joined the armed forces of the Republic of Afghanistan and pledged to work for ensuring peace in the region.

BIA reports that the voluntary recruitment of youth to armed forces continues.

More than 2,670 youth have registered their names for army service during the last month with the military commissariat in Kabul. (BIA)

/9604

DYOA Institute Trains Young Cadres

46000147a Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English
6 May 88 p 4

[Article by Nezam]

[Text] The setting up of the young cadre institute of the Central Committee of the DYOA is among the steps taken since the April Revolution to promote youth training and development.

The institute was set up as per a resolution of the Politburo of the PDPA CC in 1983. The main purpose behind it is the training of youth for the DYOA and Pioneers' Organization of Afghanistan, the vice president of the institute said. The institute imparts training in social sciences and specialization. Short term courses are conducted for specialization.

Training cadres for rural areas is another important activity of the institute. The activities of the institute are not limited in Kabul only, but extends to provinces also.

Sectional departments of the institute now function in Balkh, Kandahar and some other provinces. Short term courses are also conducted by the institute in villages where cadres are trained as activists of the DYOA and POA. Over 430 students have so far completed the courses, the vice president added.

The students of the institute visit cultural, construction and production establishments as well as armed forces units.

They also join construction brigades in their vacations. Our construction brigade won the honorary banner among other brigades.

/9604

Swedish Support of Mujahidin Decried

46000149 Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English
12 May 88 pp 1, 2

[Article by Abdul Haddi Haddi]

[Text] The daily MUSLIM OF PESHAWAR has reported in its issue of April 21 that Mrs Lena Hjelm-Wallen, minister of development aid, had talks on April 19 with Gulbuddin in Peshawar. Mrs Hjelm-Wallen said that her country would welcome the establishment of a Mujahidin office in her country. This statement of the Swedish minister enables Gulbuddin to extend his begging to more doors and to keep the flames of fratricidal war ablaze in our country. The statement of Mrs Hjelm-Wallen has evoked the wrath and anger of our people. Whom are Sweden and other imperialist countries helping in the name of Islam and calling representatives of Afghan people? Gulbuddin is now utterly isolated from the people as well as the refugees in Pakistan who are fed up with his despotism and cruelty and want to return to

their country. They hate him. To understand this, it is necessary to have a glance at the past of this mercenary who has shamelessly styled himself as the 'upholder' of Islam. Gulbuddin, son of Qadir Chunta, lacks national identity. Long years before the victory of the April Revolution he had stood against the interest of the people of our country and engaged in terrorist activities. His anti-Islamic and inhuman activities won him notoriety. He has always hatched, in collaboration with foreign intelligence services conspiracies against our people and country. It is well known that U.S. imperialism and its intelligence organizations employ notorious persons like Gulbuddin who can implement their heinous designs against our country. Thus Gulbuddin was introduced by the then minister of information and culture to the U.S. embassy. This was for establishing for him direct and regular relations with U.S. imperialism. After his anti-Islamic and extremist group was formed, he started to mercilessly loot and murder our people. Later he fled abroad from where he organised destructive activities against the country and since then has remained hostile to the people and the homeland. Gulbuddin has received huge rewards in cash and kind from his masters for shedding the blood of and robbing our people. He has thus saved money in foreign imperialist banks including the Habib Bank of Pakistan. The United States grants Gulbuddin 30,000 rupees monthly for every bullet which he and his accomplices fire to kill our innocent fellow countrymen. His other expenses are also financed by U.S. imperialism. Further, he uses the Afghan refugees in Pakistani camps as commodities for his political trade. He has purchased 120 transport vehicles and is now a shareholder of a factory for polishing lapez lazuli north of Peshawar, and a factory for processing heroin in Pakistan. He owns two laboratories for refining hashish and opium as well. The daily JANG of PAKISTAN reports, quoting informed sources, that Gulbuddin who is one of the leaders of the so-called Mujahiddin has purchased for 75 lakh rupees a palace in the university area of Peshawar from a retired commissioner of Mardan. The question arises, how he has got all this money. The answer is clear—there is no other source, but robbing the people and trading on Afghan refugees to receive funds from the CIA. All these determine the notorious identity of this known mercenary and criminal. The Swedish authorities who have shown readiness to open an office of 'Mujahiddin' in their country are in fact toeing the line of interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan and keeping the undeclared war going in our country. Now when the policy of national reconciliation with all its dimensions is being persistently implemented in Afghanistan and the Geneva accords have heralded peace for our country, it is strange that a country like Sweden should embrace Afghan extremists like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. It helps them against an independent country and renews hope for the dying force of the extremist bands to commit murder. The people of Afghanistan who hate war and bloodshed and are tirelessly striving for restoring peace through national reconciliation and the Geneva accords, severely condemn this act of the

Swedish government. Our people are convinced that any attempt of the extremist leaders like Gulbuddin to challenge peace is doomed to fail.

/9274

Over One Billion Afs Credit Advanced to Private Sector

46000148a *Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English*
6 May 88 p 1

[Text] To maintain essential supplies and price stability the government advanced 1.1 billion Afs last year on easy terms to joint stock companies, individual traders and enterprises.

The said assistance was utilized to import tea, soaps, ghee, chicken, meat, cloth, edible oil, vehicles, etc.

During the same period, a sum of 800 million Afs credit was recovered from traders and joint stock companies. (BIA)

/9604

Health Ministry Plans To Rebuild Clinics

46000148b *Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English*
12 May 88 p 1

[Text] Four main health clinics and 10 subsidiary health clinics were rehabilitated last year in the centre and provinces of the country.

A spokesman of the Ministry of Public Health said to a BIA reporter: "Rehabilitation work of 40 main health clinics was started last year. Till now the work on Zekrullah-i-Shaheed health clinic in Jauzjan province, Wakhan and Darwaz health clinics in Badakhshan province, and health clinic of Greshk has been completed, and they have started functioning."

The source added, "In the 9-year old imposed war in our country 113 main health clinics were damaged. Of them, 88 main health clinics have, so far, been rehabilitated in the provinces.

It is planned to establish 15 main health clinics and 12 subsidiary health clinics in the centre and provinces of the country to render health services to the people.

As part of the development plan of the Ministry of Public Health in 1367 (1988) 12 health clinics will be rehabilitated, works on last year's 20 health projects, 14 new health projects and health institutions will be established. It is also planned to replace at a cost of 50 million Afs medical equipment in hospitals.

Now 69 hospitals, 5 polyclinics, 34 mother-and-child care clinics, 55 family guidance association clinics, 51 health clinics in schools, 20 health clinics in production

institutions, 20 blood banks, 64 x-ray centres, 122 main health clinics and 7 subsidiary health clinics are functioning all over the country," he concluded.

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IRAN

Rafsanjani on Elections, Toxins, War, Other Issues

46400121a Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian
25 Apr 88 p 1

[Interview with Majles Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani by Italian TV Network Two and LA STAMPA; date and place not specified]

[Text] Last week a reporter from Italian television Network Two and a correspondent from the Italian newspaper LA STAMPA interviewed Majles Speaker Rafsanjani.

During this interview, Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Hashemi Rafsanjani gave answers to tens of questions presented to him. The complete text was made available to us for publication by the Majles public relations service, and is presented for our esteemed readers below.

[Question] Concerning the war issue, behind you is a poster showing Imam Khomeyni's remark, "We are victorious." This is a war that has divided the Muslim world and left many dead.

[Answer] In any case it is a war that was imposed on us; we did not want such a war to occur. They imposed the war on us when we were not prepared and had just had the revolution. There was neither a revolutionary guard nor an army. We regret the casualties this war has had and will have, but a huge price must ultimately be paid to obtain justice and procure rights.

[Question] The split that has developed among the Arabs was created by the war, and continues to intensify. Can this breach be closed?

[Answer] We think we will be good friends with the Arabs after the war ends, just as we are now good friends with some Arab nations such as Syria and Libya, as well as some other countries. We have no designs on Arab land, but we can support them with the problems they have. Then they will be satisfied and understand that Saddam was a problem for them. Then the road to unity will be open.

[Question] The Arab nations think that Iran cannot be trusted. They remember that 10 years ago you said "We have woven a net that will envelop the world", and this is the reason they cannot trust Iran.

[Answer] That "net" of ours is in their interest. Our slogan is that the nations should be free and independent, and not under the dominion of the imperialist powers. We are prepared to help our neighbors to this end. Very well, if they are worried about this, they obviously do not have good intentions; we think that if there is anxiety over this matter it is misplaced.

[Question] There is truth in their claim that Iran is expansionist, not with regard to land and territory, but with regard to ideological and cognitive principles. This is shown by the Hezbollahis of Lebanon, aid to the Kurds of Iraq, terrorist incidents, as well as the recent Kuwaiti airliner hijacking episode.

[Answer] We want Islamic thought to prevail in the Islamic nations. Yes, we truly think that the salvation of Muslims will be achieved through the dominance of Islam. However, we will not do this by force, for we want them to be convinced themselves that this is their salvation and happiness. If they are not convinced, we will not use force. In Lebanon, those people who are convinced are fighting.

We are opposed to the terrorist incidents in this area. We ourselves suffer more than anyone else from terrorists. We have lost many of the great personalities of the revolution to assassinations, such as Martyr Beheshti and many others, as well as Martyr Raja'i and Martyr Bamonar, as you surely know. As for the matter of hostage taking, the Western nations have had more hostages taken in Lebanon than anyone else, and they are still entangled there. You know of the bombings as well; they have hijacked our aircraft in Iran and continue to do so. Naturally we are opposed to this recent hijacking incident, and others like it. The only thing we did was to release a number of passengers without getting anything in return. It is a sign of their ignorance that, instead of thanking us for our service, they accuse us again, to make us regret and not give any help in the future.

[Question] So why has Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, accused you time and again, even in the recent incident pertaining to the hijacked Kuwaiti airliner?

[Answer] Ask him the question. They themselves accuse others, but we make no accusations. However, we actually think that this aircraft was hijacked to eclipse the propaganda against Iraq concerning the city of Halabcheh, and they will not allow this incident to end. They continue to prolong it to create more news and headlines about this subject. As for the mining incident that took place recently in the Persian Gulf where an American ship struck a mine, we think this incident was created to prevent the removal of European mine sweepers, which were about to leave. The event was attributed to us, but others reached this conclusion because we have few propaganda resources. Naturally we suffer in this way.

[Question] Then what is your country's position regarding the Palestinian question? Do you accept Arafat?

[Answer] We accept the struggle of the Palestinian people. We support anyone in Palestine fighting to save his country. We do not accept the current notion of compromise, where they think they can obtain the rights of the people of Palestine through negotiations. We do not accept anyone who works in that direction. Of course this is our view, and in practice we support the Palestinian fighters.

[Question] Then, in your view, which of the Arafat activities are constructive?

[Answer] I don't want to go into details. In general I think that with regard to talks nothing will come to the Palestinians now unless they make advances through struggle, in which case of course new conditions would arise. Israel, as we know, will never under any circumstances give up Palestinian land. Talks and discussions merely waste time.

[Question] Mr Majles Speaker, we met with you about a year ago in this very office. The day before that His Holiness the Imam, at a gathering at Jamaran attended by the people, called upon the nation's officials to observe unity of speech. He was worried that there could be a division among the nation's leaders. The next day we asked you if the Imam's call wasn't an indication of division among the nation's officials. You smiled and said: In Iran we have something to facilitate and simplify, and we call it the Imam's line, and there is another process that includes the views of the economic and bazaar faction. You continued: Every group tries to get its views to prevail, and if their exchanges of views, talks, and debates are a form of struggle, it is not a struggle for power. Today we have come to see you after the elections. The elections were carried out despite the rockets. I ask you, will we see direct reforms in the government, or will we see a system we could call conservative, and which group will become the spokesman of the views of the people and the government after the elections?

[Answer] In my view, it is not yet very clear what the views will be of most of the deputies elected. To see what their differences will be, we must wait a few days for the new Majlis to be formed and some issue to be proposed. The votes of the deputies will then clarify the issue. A great many of those elected are unknown to me. In any case, I do not foresee any important changes in the third Majlis; I think that in the future we will have something resembling the second Majlis with minor differences.

[Question] Your answer was very cautious and political. The imam said that those who have suffered and are in general oppressed people must have a representative in the Majles, and is hoping that there will be a change in the atmosphere of the Majles. If you deem it advisable, please discuss this matter further.

[Answer] In the past the Majles was just this way. We have not had a bill or project come up in the Majles in the interest of the deprived and the oppressed that was rejected. If we have had a problem, it was with regard to the Council of Guardians, which vetoed some of the enactments of the Majles.

[Question] Mr Majles Speaker, in a conversation you had with a number of scholars and specialists who had come from Esfahan, you said: We hope that our defense will be strong enough that we will not be forced to use chemical weapons, but if this necessity is felt, Iran will not be responsible for the consequences. Addressing the hypocritical governments of the West and East, you said that Iran has never used chemical weapons, and that if it did use them, it has the courage to say so plainly. I ask you, does Iran have the will and the capability to respond in kind at any moment to a chemical attack?

[Answer] We have the ability to produce in quantity, but it is our wish not to fill our warehouses. It is our hope never to make use of these substances, and it has not yet been necessary for us to produce them in quantity. However, our preparedness is such that in a short time we could have sufficient quantities of these dangerous substances.

[Question] Mr Majlis Speaker, for eight years now, as you say yourself, you have had a hand in prosecuting the fighting of this imposed war. This war's victims and losses in every area, economic and otherwise, have been enormous. You have said, if I have understood you correctly, that you will accept Resolution 598 if the aggressor in the war, meaning Saddam Huseyn, leader of the Ba'thist regime, be designated as such, and since neither the United Nations nor either of the two Western and Eastern superpowers have made such a decision, the war will continue to its end. It is possible that for the sake of a principle you will continue this imposed war for a long time, and there will be daily additions to the list of innocent victims and victims of Iraqi missiles striking the cities; there may even be the danger of another Halabcheh on a scale a thousand times greater. If the Iraqis bombard Iranian cities with chemical rockets there will be a mass slaughter. I sincerely submit to you that I cannot see why Saddam Huseyn cannot be forgiven after eight years, if the idea of forgiveness exists in Shi'ism, if it accepts forgiveness, and if there is a belief in forgiveness.

[Answer] Concerning forgiveness, if we knew we had the right to forgive in that way, or even if this forgiveness would be in our interest, we would do so, but we believe that nothing will better serve the interests of the nations in our region than obtaining justice. We think that if this war ends with Saddam being forgiven, the region will not see true peace. The forgiveness will be followed by a constant war of nerves, a cold war and an arms race. Consequently the superpowers will exact tolls from both of us and the nations in the area will take sides against one another. We think if we achieve justice and if the

aggressor is punished, Iran, Iraq and the entire area will attain lasting peace, just as occurred in Europe. What would have happened if the Nazis had remained in power after World War II? Wouldn't we now have World War III? When Hitler was removed, Europe and the world were put at ease. If the great powers do not want to designate and punish the aggressor, we have this power and we will do it ourselves, although we would prefer to see this happen with fewer casualties. The day could come when we will despair and bring all our capabilities to bear. Of course on that day there will be tremendous losses in the area.

Then the Majlis speaker told the Italian interviewer: I want to ask them a question.

Mr Hashemi Rafsanjani: They said they have practically given up on the great Western nations designating Saddam as the aggressor. Don't they really consider it somewhat unconscionable of the Western governments for not being prepared to acknowledge this truth, even though they know that Saddam started the war and is the aggressor and has violated international conventions at sea, in the air, on land and by striking cities, as well as by causing the tragedy at Halabcheh?

Italian correspondent: Mr Majlis Speaker, I sincerely submit to you that the two superpowers will never capitulate and officially recognize Saddam as the aggressor, and if you believe this, I must say that this is a gullible position, because the game of war and politics is very large, and the Arab nations are just as important and perhaps more important than Iran to the two superpower blocs. Therefore, they will never accuse him directly of being the aggressor. Thus, with all humility, as a reporter, I say here that this is not a useful way to reach an end to this affair.

Mr Hashemi Rafsanjani: Aren't you sorry that the fulcrum of power is in the hands of such people, who so unjustly deal with important historical events?

Italian correspondent: Mr Majlis Speaker, I am not the president of a great power or the president of any country, I'm a newspaper reporter who sees reality. I obviously don't have the power to judge, and clearly we want to achieve our rights. Not only you, and not only the developing nations, but many European nations as well want to escape the torment of these superpowers. History is full of instances of injustice, national uprisings, and I am here talking to you, a great official in this nation, and I ask you this question.

Mr Hashemi Rafsanjani: If we think the way you think and if everyone thinks this way, the world will have to despair of justice, and this is bitter. We do not think this way, we consider the nations powerful. You can see that Afghanistan was victorious.

Italian correspondent: I say this merely for the sake of argument, as the question of a newspaper journalist. It isn't as if everyone thinks this way, that is, this is not my own view that I'm presenting.

[Question] You said that Saddam is worse than Hitler because he has violated international law. There is a Christian saying, "Let him who is without sin cast the first stone." You also occupied the American embassy and took hostages, and this was itself a kind of violation of international law. The issue is not one of forgiving Saddam, the question is whether or not it is possible to some extent to prevent the sacrifice of people and nations, especially the Iranian nation. You're a politician, and we know that in politics there is another way, called compromise. Therefore, with the help and assistance of friendly countries, including Italy as a prime example, don't you want to approach some form of compromise by accepting an idea or some kind of indirect negotiations in order to save the peace?

[Answer] Concerning the American embassy in Iran, we have published the documents. The American embassy here had been converted to a center for spying and plotting against our revolution, and the documents have been published. At the same time they took the shah to America and gave him shelter, a criminal who had killed many people, fled to America and wasted so much of the national wealth. Our people knew that the shah was America's own hand-picked agent; they were rightfully angered and reacted accordingly. Our revolution is truly populist, and it is difficult for us to act against the views of our people. When we satisfied our people, we resolved the matter without inflicting casualties on the Americans in Iran. Therefore, as the country's leaders, we resolved the matter with expedience, and we did not allow bloodshed or anything else to occur.

Concerning compromise, in answering the previous question I said that if we truly find that to be in our interest we will have to compromise. We accept this policy. I explained that this is not in our interest now. This compromise could turn out to be very costly for us, the region, and even the people of Iraq. We proposed a specific plan to the Security Council. We said that all of them should accept him as the aggressor, they must designate the Baghdad regime as the aggressor, and we would accept a cease fire until the responsible committee determines a punishment for the aggressor, and of course this is something that everyone accepts. This is our right, why don't they do this?

[Question] I thank you very much. Here I will mention Khomeini's remark, "neither East nor West, but Islam." I say neither East nor West, but peace. If I'm not mistaken, the word "Islam" is derived from "salam," meaning "peace," and I hope that the peace of God will be with you.

[Answer] But true peace, not superficial peace.

[Question] Mr Rafsanjani, we've just spoken about the matter of the American embassy. History moves on. Mr Reagan has called the Soviet Union the evil empire, and you consider Reagan even worse and you accuse him of this. Under what conditions will Iran's relations with America improve?

[Answer] In addition to being responsible for the oppression under the shah's regime in Iran, America was also hostile towards us after the revolution. I have said repeatedly that the first step America must take to improve its relations with us is to put aside its hostile attitude. We should understand that America is not hostile towards the Islamic revolution; if this occurs, the way will be open for many things. (It is necessary to note that this interview took place before America's direct intervention in the Persian Gulf.)

[Question] Could you inform us of the source and origin of Irangate?

[Answer] We have said everything clearly.

[Question] Wasn't this an event with two sides, an American side and an Iranian side?

[Answer] The Americans themselves should answer as to what their objectives were; we were seeking to meet our need for arms. We met some people who were willing to sell us the arms we needed, and we bought them.

[Question] One day we will know the truth, but the true drama is the same drama that Iran is living now. It is the drama of war; your war is also a religious war, and volunteers and members of the mobilization are fighting for martyrdom. If this war continues in the same way, won't it end at the cost of more casualties and more lives?

[Answer] Of course it is not true that they are fighting for martyrdom. They are fighting for their rights. They also accept martyrdom. Of course, as long as there is a war there will be casualties, and we hope to be able to end the war soon.

[Question] Mr Hashemi Rafsanjani, both abroad and within Iran you have come to be known as a very wise, intelligent, and skilled person who believes in principles. Isn't it true that this land of ours has seen much bloodshed, and that if this war continues this blood price will continue to be paid?

[Answer] I explained that if this war ends in this way, we will see more bloodshed later on. The controversy that would remain would have very dangerous effects, and whenever the Ba'th party came to power again, this war would certainly begin anew; it would be the same situation that exists now between Israel and the Arabs.

[Question] I will now ask questions about recent issues. The Iranian government's declared position is completely opposed to the Geneva Convention. There are two million Afghan refugees in your country. Reagan has also announced that if necessary they will support the Afghan mojahedin. Therefore, on this point your country and the United States have a shared point of view.

[Answer] There is also a point of divergence in this unified point of view. We say that the people of Afghanistan must decide their own fate. The objection we have expressed here is that the people of Afghanistan are not involved in this agreement. If these people sign this agreement one day, we will not object and we will go along. On whose behalf has America signed this agreement?

[Question] America played the role of a guarantor with regard to this agreement; the Soviet Union has likewise adopted the role of a guarantor. Iran could also play the role of a guarantor for the people of Afghanistan.

[Answer] Guarantor on behalf of the people of Afghanistan?

[Question] Iran can promise security for the people and the nation of Afghanistan.

[Answer] They have given us no such right to act as guarantor for them. I'm talking about the people of Afghanistan; we consider interference in the affairs of others a form of oppression.

[Question] The moment that this interview with you is broadcast, the people will ask themselves a brief question: Why are the people of Iran so inflexible? Is inflexibility what is meant by the full observance of justice?

[Answer] We do not think that one should bargain on principles. Humanity suffers when it tramples its principles for the sake of material considerations. We are prepared to show flexibility in many instances, if our principles are not sacrificed. For example, we do not allow ourselves to be the guardian of the people of Afghanistan. These guardians who have seen themselves as the guardians of other countries have done great harm to the world. This should not be called inflexibility and stubbornness.

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Non-Oil Exports Reached 995 Million Dollars
46400124 Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian
28 Mar 88 p 11

[Text] Economic service. With the export of more than 1 million tons of non-oil goods in the 11 months of 1366 [21 March 1987-19 February 1988], the amount of foreign currency obtained from the export of these goods reached \$995 million.

The Iranian customs public relations office announced the above statement and announced the statistics of the exported non-oil goods as follows:

In the 11 months of 1366 [1987/88] mentioned above, about 1,059,000 tons of non-oil goods, valued at 70,670 million rials (equivalent to \$995 million), were exported to other countries, which, compared to a similar period in 1365 [21 March 1986-19 February 1987], indicates an increase of 87.3 percent in weight and 15.9 percent in value.

Several major export items are as follows, arranged in order of importance: Handwoven carpets, pistachio nuts, shelled pistachio nuts, and various kinds of animal hides, which made up about 67.36 percent of the total value of the exports. The increase in weight of the exports is the result of the export of large amounts of sulphur, 138,000 tons in weight, which makes up 13.04 percent of the total weight of the exports, as well as fresh fruits and vegetables, at 214,000 tons, which makes up 20.24 percent of the total weight of the exports.

Likewise, mineral and metal clods weighing 132,000 tons, and stone and construction materials weighing 124,000 tons made up 12.5 and 11.96 percent respectively of the total exports during the above mentioned period.

About 10,800 tons of handwoven woolen carpets, valued at 30,264 million rials, were exported during the above 11 months of 1366 [1987/88], which marked an increase of 49.8 percent in weight and 16.35 percent in value over a comparable period the previous year.

The export of pistachio nuts and shelled pistachio nuts, weighing 52,100 tons and valued at 12,391 million rials, marked an increased of about 93.63 percent in weight and 70.67 percent in value over a comparable period in the previous year, which was about 26,900 tons in weight and valued at 7,277 million rials.

The export of various kinds of animal hides, 12,180 tons in weight and valued at 5,666 million rials, in spite of a 24.48 percent decrease in weight compared to a similar period in 1365 [1986/87], increased by 46.47 percent in value, as a result of the high quality and increased value of Iranian animal hides exported in the world markets.

Exports of Stone and Construction Materials

During the period under study, about 124,000 tons of stone and construction materials, valued at 255 million rials, were exported, an increase of 393 percent in weight and 24.13 percent in value compared to 1365 [1986/87].

The export of chromite in the 11 months of 1366 [1987/88] consisted of about 26,000 tons, valued at 175 million rials, which was an increase of about 108 percent in weight compared to the previous year. Ferrous oxide, 1,000 tons in weight and 31 million rials in value, was also among the exports.

Export of Tricot and Knit Fabrics

The export of tricot and ready-made knit fabrics as well as various kinds of yarn and woolen and cotton fabrics, at 1,155 tons in weight and 821.88 million rials in value, increased 269.6 percent in weight and 156.1 percent in value for tricot and knit fabrics, and increased 277.7 percent in weight and decreased 19 percent in value for cotton fabrics, compared to a similar period in 1365 [1986/87].

The level of export of woolen fabrics was 76 tons, valued at 8,436,000 rials. These goods were not exported last year.

Export of Marine Products

During the same period, the export of marine products—caviar; fresh, frozen and smoked fish; and various kinds of shrimp—amounted to 560 tons in weight and 2,241 million rials in value, of which caviar increased by 145 tons in weight, or 64.77 percent, and 1,652 million rials in value, or 94.69 percent.

And the export of fresh, frozen and smoked fish, at 403 tons in weight and 587 million rials in value, increased by 34.3 percent in weight and 425 percent in value compared to a similar period in 1365 [1986/87], which involved 300 tons in weight and 111.7 million rials in value.

Among the other exported goods in the above 11 months of this year were pharmaceutical and industrial goods at 5,780 tons in weight and 611.8 million rials in value, including storax, at 1,480 tons in weight and 256 million rials in value, and licorice extract, at 866 tons in weight and 90 million rials in value, which increased by 76.01 percent in weight and 8.95 percent in value compared to a similar period in 1365 [1986/87].

Export of Minerals

During the 11 months of 1366 [1987/88], goods such as minerals and sea salt, at 15,160 tons in weight and 7.58 million rials in value, and various kinds of tragacanth, at 900 tons in weight and 183 million rials in value, were also exported.

Also exported were 33,000 tons of raisins, black and green, valued at 1,467 million rials, and 2,520 tons of dried apricots and peaches, valued at 203 million rials.

The export of electrical equipment and vehicles and their parts, at 670 tons in weight and 244 million rials in value, increased significantly compared to a similar period the previous year.

It should be noted that of all the exports during the above 11 months of this year, about 68.51 percent of the weight were transported by sea. In this area, the Bandar 'Abbas

Port, from which about 62.7 of the weight of all exports were made, has been the most active of Iranian customs in terms of exports. High-priced goods exported from the customs of southern Tehran, Mehrabad and Kerman make up 39.68 percent, 17.67 percent and 17.53 percent, respectively.

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JULY 6, 1988